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Abstract. Published exactly seventy years ago, Jeffreys’s Theory of
Probability (1939) has had a unique impact on the Bayesian commu-
nity and is now considered to be one of the main classics in Bayesian
Statistics as well as the initiator of the objective Bayes school. In par-
ticular, its advances on the derivation of noninformative priors as well
as on the scaling of Bayes factors have had a lasting impact on the field.
However, the book reflects the characteristics of the time, especially in
terms of mathematical rigor. In this paper we point out the fundamen-
tal aspects of this reference work, especially the thorough coverage of
testing problems and the construction of both estimation and testing
noninformative priors based on functional divergences. Our major aim
here is to help modern readers in navigating in this difficult text and
in concentrating on passages that are still relevant today.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The theory of probability makes it possible to
respect the great men on whose shoulders we stand.
H. Jeffreys, Theory of Probability, Section 1.6.
Few Bayesian books other than Theory of Proba-
bility are so often cited as a foundational text.1 This
book is rightly considered as the principal reference
in modern Bayesian statistics. Among other innova-
tions, Theory of Probability states the general princi-
ple for deriving noninformative priors from the sam-
pling distribution, using Fisher information. It also
This is an electronic reprint of the original article
published by the Institute of Mathematical Statistics in
Statistical Science, 2009, Vol. 24, No. 2, 141–172. This
reprint differs from the original in pagination and
typographic detail.
1Among the “Bayesian classics,” only Savage (1954), DeG-
root (1970) and Berger (1985) seem to get more citations than
Jeffreys (1939, 1948, 1961), the more recent book by Bernardo
and Smith (1994) coming fairly close. The homonymous The-
ory of Probability by de Finetti (1974, 1975) gets quoted a
third as much (Source: Google Scholar).
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proposes a clear processing of Bayesian testing, in-
cluding the dimension-free scaling of Bayes factors.
This comprehensive treatment of Bayesian inference
from an objective Bayes perspective is a major inno-
vation for the time, and it has certainly contributed
to the advance of a field that was then submitted to
severe criticisms by R. A. Fisher (Aldrich, 2008) and
others, and was in danger of becoming a feature of
the past. As pointed out by Zellner (1980) in his in-
troduction to a volume of essays in honor of Harold
Jeffreys, a fundamental strength of Theory of Prob-
ability is its affirmation of a unitarian principle in
the statistical processing of all fields of science.
For a 21st century reader, Jeffreys’s Theory of
Probability is nonetheless puzzling for its lack of
formalism, including its difficulties in handling im-
proper priors, its reliance on intuition, its long de-
bate about the nature of probability, and its re-
peated attempts at philosophical justifications. The
title itself is misleading in that there is absolutely
no exposition of the mathematical bases of probabil-
ity theory in the sense of Billingsley (1986) or Feller
(1970): “Theory of Inverse Probability” would have
been more accurate. In other words, the style of the
book appears to be both verbose and often vague in
its mathematical foundations for a modern reader.2
(Good, 1980, also acknowledges that many passages
of the book are “obscure.”) It is thus difficult to ex-
tract from this dense text the principles that made
Theory of Probability the reference it is nowadays.
In this paper we endeavor to revisit the book from
a Bayesian perspective, in order to separate founda-
tional principles from less relevant parts.
This review is neither a historical nor a critical
exercise: while conscious that Theory of Probabil-
ity reflects the idiosyncrasies both of the scientific
achievements of the 1930’s—with, in particular, the
emerging formalization of Probability as a branch of
Mathematics against the ongoing debate on the na-
ture of probabilities—and of Jeffreys’s background—
as a geophysicist—, we aim rather at providing the
modern reader with a reading guide, focusing on the
pioneering advances made by this book. Parts that
correspond to the lack (at the time) of analytical
(like matrix algebra) or numerical (like simulation)
tools and their substitution by approximation de-
vices (that are not used any longer, even though
2In order to keep readability as high as possible, we shall
use modern notation whenever the original notation is either
unclear or inconsistent, for example, Greek letters for param-
eters and roman letters for observations.
they may be surprisingly accurate), and parts that
are linked with Bayesian perspectives will be covered
fleetingly. Thus, when pointing out notions that may
seem outdated or even mathematically unsound by
modern standards, our only aim is to help the mod-
ern reader stroll past them, and we apologize in ad-
vance if, despite our intent, our tone seems overly
presumptuous: it is rather a reflection of our igno-
rance of the current conditions at the time since (to
borrow from the above quote which may sound it-
self somehow presumptuous) we stand respectfully
at the feet of this giant of Bayesian Statistics.
The plan of the paper follows Theory of Probabil-
ity linearly by allocating a section to each chapter of
the book (Appendices are only mentioned through-
out the paper). Section 10 contains a brief conclu-
sion. Note that, in the following, words, sentences
or passages quoted from Theory of Probability are
written in italics with no precise indication of their
location, in order to keep the style as light as pos-
sible. We also stress that our review is based on
the third edition of Theory of Probability (Jeffreys,
1961), since this is both the most matured and the
most available version (through the last reprint by
Oxford University Press in 1998). Contemporary re-
views of Theory of Probability are found in Good
(1962) and Lindley (1962).
2. CHAPTER I: FUNDAMENTAL NOTIONS
The posterior probabilities of the hypotheses are
proportional to the products of the prior
probabilities and the likelihoods.
H. Jeffreys, Theory of Probability, Section 1.2.
The first chapter of Theory of Probability sets gen-
eral goals for a coherent theory of induction. More
importantly, it proposes an axiomatic (if slightly
tautological) derivation of prior distributions, while
justifying this approach as coherent, compatible with
the ordinary process of learning and allowing for the
incorporation of imprecise information. It also rec-
ognizes the fundamental property of coherence when
updating posterior distributions, since they can be
used as the prior probability in taking into account
of a further set of data. Despite a style that is often
difficult to penetrate, this is thus a major chapter of
Theory of Probability. It will also become clearer at a
later stage that the principles exposed in this chap-
ter correspond to the (modern) notion of objective
Bayes inference: despite mentions of prior probabil-
ities as reflections of prior belief or existing pieces of
THEORY OF PROBABILITY REVISITED 3
information, Theory of Probability remains strictly
“objective” in that prior distributions are always de-
rived analytically from sampling distributions and
that all examples are treated in a noninformative
manner. One may find it surprising that a physi-
cist like Jeffreys does not emphasise the appeal of
subjective Bayes, that is, the ability to take into ac-
count genuine prior information in a principled way.
But this is in line with both his predecessors, in-
cluding Laplace and Bayes, and their use of uniform
priors and his main field of study that he perceived
as objective (Lindley, 2008, private communication),
while one of the main appeals of Theory of Probabil-
ity is to provide a general and coherent framework
to derive objective priors.
2.1 A Philosophical Exercise
The chapter starts in Section 1.0 with an epis-
temological discussion of the nature of (statistical)
inference. Some sections are quite puzzling. For in-
stance, the example that the kinematic equation for
an object in free-fall,
s= a+ ut+ 12gt
2,
cannot be deduced from observations is used as an
argument against deduction under the reasoning that
an infinite number of functions,
s= a+ ut+ 12gt
2 + f(t)(t− t1) · · · (t− tn),
also apply to describe a free fall observed at times
t1, . . . , tn. The limits of the epistemological discus-
sion in those early pages are illustrated by the in-
troduction of Ockham’s razor (the choice of the sim-
plest law that fits the fact), as the meaning of what
a simplest law can be remains unclear, and the sec-
tion lacks a clear (objective) argument in motivating
this choice, besides common sense, while the discus-
sion ends up with a somehow paradoxical statement
that, since deductive logic provides no explanation
of the choice of the simplest law, this is proof that
deductive logic is grossly inadequate to cover scien-
tific and practical requirements. On the other hand,
and from a statistician’s narrower perspective, one
can re-interpret this gravity example as possibly the
earliest discussion of the conceptual difficulties asso-
ciated with model choice, which are still not entirely
resolved today. In that respect, it is quite fascinat-
ing to see this discussion appear so early in the book
(third page), as if Jeffreys had perceived how impor-
tant this debate would become later.
Note that, maybe due to this very call to Ockham,
the later Bayesian literature abounds in references
to Ockham’s razor with little formalization of this
principle, even though Berger and Jefferys (1992),
Balasubramanian (1997) and MacKay (2002) develop
elaborate approaches. In particular, the definition
of the Bayes factor in Section 1.6 can be seen as a
partial implementation of Ockham’s razor when set-
ting the probabilities of both models equal to 1/2.
In the beginning of his Chapter 28, entitled Model
Choice and Occam’s Razor, MacKay (2002) argues
that Bayesian inference embodies Ockham’s razor
because “simple” models tend to produce more pre-
cise predictions and, thus, when the data is equally
compatible with several models, the simplest one
will end up as the most probable. This is generally
true, even though there are some counterexamples
in Bayesian nonparametrics.
Overall, we nonetheless feel that this part of The-
ory of Probability could be skipped at first read-
ing as less relevant for Bayesian studies. In particu-
lar, the opposition between mathematical deduction
and statistical induction does not appear to carry a
strong argument, even though the distinction needs
(needed?) to be made for mathematically oriented
readers unfamiliar with statistics. However, from a
historical point of view, this opposition must be con-
sidered against the then-ongoing debate about the
nature of induction, as illustrated, for instance, by
Karl Popper’s articles of this period about the logi-
cal impossibility of induction (Popper, 1934).
2.2 Foundational Principles
The text becomes more focused when dealing with
the construction of a theory of inference: while some
notions are yet to be defined, including the pervasive
evidence, sentences like inference involves in its very
nature the possibility that the alternative chosen as
the most likely may in fact be wrong are in line with
our current interpretation of modeling and obviously
with the Bayesian paradigm. In Section 1.1 Jeffreys
sets up a collection of postulates or rules that act
like axioms for his theory of inference, some of which
require later explanations to be fully understood:
1. All hypotheses must be explicitly stated and the
conclusions must follow from the hypotheses: what
may first sound like an obvious scientific principle
is in fact a leading characteristic of Bayesian statis-
tics. While it seems to open a whole range of new
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questions—“To what extent must we define our be-
lief in the statistical models used to build our in-
ference? How can a unique conclusion stem from a
given model and a given set of observations?”—and
while it may sound far too generic to be useful, we
may interpret this statement as setting the working
principle of Bayesian decision theory: given a prior,
a sampling distribution, an observation and a loss
function, there exists a single decision procedure.
In contrast, the frequentist theories of Neyman or
of Fisher require the choice of ad hoc procedures,
whose (good or bad) properties they later analyze.
But this may be a far-fetched interpretation of this
rule at this stage even though the comment will ap-
pear more clearly later.
2. The theory must be self-consistent. The state-
ment is somehow a repetition of the previous rule
and it is only later (in Section 3.10) that its mean-
ing becomes clearer, in connection with the intro-
duction of Jeffreys’s noninformative priors as a self-
contained principle. Consistency is nonetheless a dom-
inant feature of the book, as illustrated in Section 3.1
with the rejection of Haldane’s prior.3
3. Any rule must be applicable in practice. This
“rule” does not seem to carry any weight in prac-
tice. In addition, the explicit prohibition of esti-
mates based on impossible experiments sounds im-
plementable only through deductive arguments. But
this leads to the exclusion of rules based on fre-
quency arguments and, as such, is fundamental in
setting a Bayesian framework. Alternatively (and
this is another interpretation), this constraint should
be worded in more formal terms of the measurability
of procedures.
4. The theory must provide explicitly for the pos-
sibility that inferences made by it may turn out to
be wrong. This is both a fundamental aspect of sta-
tistical inference and an indication of a surprising
view of inference. Indeed, even when conditioning
on the model, inference is never right in the sense
that a point estimate rarely gives the true answer.
It may be that Jeffreys is solely thinking of sta-
tistical testing, in which case the rightfulness of a
decision is necessarily conditional on the truthful-
ness of the corresponding model and thus dubious.
A more relative (or more precise) statement would
3Consistency is then to be understood in the weak sense of
invariant under reparameterization, which is a usual argument
for Jeffreys’s principle, not in terms of asymptotic convergence
properties.
have been more adequate. But, from reading fur-
ther (as in Section 1.2), it appears that this rule is
to be understood as the foundational principle (the
chief constructive rule) for defining prior distribu-
tions. While this is certainly not clear at this stage,
Bayesian inference does indeed provide for the pos-
sibility that the model under study is not correct
and for the unreliability of the resulting inference
via a posterior probability.
5. The theory must not deny any empirical propo-
sition a priori. This principle remains unclear when
put into practice. If it is to be understood in the
sense of a physical theory, there is no reason why
some empirical proposition could not be excluded
from the start. If it is the sense of an inferential
theory, then the statement would require a better
definition of empirical proposition. But Jeffreys us-
ing the epithet a priori seems to imply that the prior
distribution corresponding to the theory must be as
inclusive as possible. This certainly makes sense as
long as prior information does not exclude parts of
the parameter space as, for instance, in Physics.
6. The number of postulates should be reduced to a
minimum. This rule sounds like an embedded Ock-
ham’s razor, but, more positively, it can also be in-
terpreted as a call for noninformative priors. Once
again, the vagueness of the wording opens a wide
range of interpretations.
7. The theory need not represent thought-processes
in details, but should agree with them in outline.
This vague principle could be an attempt at rec-
onciliating statistical theories, but it does not give
clear directions on how to proceed. In the light of
Jeffreys’s arguments, it could rather signify that the
construction of prior distributions cannot exactly re-
flect an actual construction in real life. Since a non-
informative (or “objective”) perspective is adopted
for most of the book, this is more likely to be a pre-
liminary argument in favor of this line of thought. In
Section 1.2 this rule is invoked to derive the (prior)
ordering of events.
8. An objection carries no weight if [it] would in-
validate part of pure mathematics. This rule grounds
Theory of Probability within mathematics, which may
be a necessary reminder in the spirit of the time
(where some were attempting to dissociate statis-
tics from mathematics).
The next paragraph discusses the notion of prob-
ability. Its interest is mostly historical: in the early
1930’s, the axiomatic definition of probability based
THEORY OF PROBABILITY REVISITED 5
on Kolmogorov’s axioms was not yet universally ac-
cepted, and there were still attempts to base this
definition on limiting properties. In particular,
Lebesgue integration was not part of the undergrad-
uate curriculum till the late 1950’s at either Cam-
bridge or Oxford (Lindley, 2008, private communi-
cation). This debate is no longer relevant, and the
current theory of probability, as derived from mea-
sure theory, does not bear further discussion. This
also removes the ambiguity of constructing objective
probabilities as derived from actual or possible ob-
servations. A probability model is to be understood
as a mathematical (and thus unobjectionable) con-
struct, in agreement with Rule 8 above.
Then follows (still in Section 1.1) a rather long
debate on causality versus determinism. While the
principles stated in those pages are quite accept-
able, the discussion only uses the most basic concept
of determinism, namely, that identical causes give
identical effects, in the sense of Laplace. We thus
agree with Jeffreys that, at this level, the principle
is useless, but the same paragraph actually leaves
us quite confused as to its real purpose. A likely ex-
planation (Lindley, 2008, personal communication)
is that Jeffreys stresses the inevitability of probabil-
ity statements in Science: (measurement) errors are
not mistakes but part of the picture.
2.3 Prior Distributions
In Section 1.2 Jeffreys introduces the notion of
prior in an indirect way, by considering that the
probability of a proposition is always conditional on
some data and that the occurrence of new items of
information (new evidence) on this proposition sim-
ply updates the available data. This is slightly con-
trary to our current way of defining a prior distri-
bution pi on a parameter θ as the information avail-
able on θ prior to the observation of the data, but
it simply conveys the fact that the prior distribu-
tion must be derived from some prior items of in-
formation about θ. As pointed out by Jeffreys, this
also allows for the coexistence of prior distributions
for different experts within the same probabilistic
framework.4 In the sequel all statements will, how-
ever, condition on the same data.
The following paragraphs derive standard math-
ematical logic axioms that directly follow from a
4Jeffreys seems to further note that the same conditioning
applies for the model of reference.
formal (modern) definition of a probability distri-
bution, with the provision that this probability is
always conditional on the same data. This is also
reminiscent of the derivation of the existence of a
prior distribution from an ordering of prior proba-
bilities in DeGroot (1970), but the discussion about
the arbitrary ranking of probabilities between 0 and
1 may sound anecdotal today. Note also that, from
a mathematical point of view, defining only condi-
tional probabilities like P (p|q) is somehow superflu-
ous in that, if the conditioning q is to remain fixed,
P (·|q) is a regular probability distribution, while, if
q is to be updated into qr, P (·|qr) can be derived
from P (·|q) by Bayes’ theorem (which is to be in-
troduced later). Therefore, in all cases, P (·|q) ap-
pears like the reference probability. At some stage,
while stating that the probability of the sure event
is equal to one is merely a convention, Jeffreys indi-
cates that, when expressing ignorance over an infi-
nite range of values of a quantity, it may be conve-
nient to use ∞ instead. Clearly, this paves the way
for the introduction of improper priors.5 Unfortu-
nately, the convention and the motivation (to keep
ratios for finite ranges determinate) do not seem
correct, if in tune with the perspective of the time
(see, e.g., Lhoste, 1923; Broemeling and Broemel-
ing, 2003). Notably, setting all events involving an
infinite range with a probability equal to ∞ seems
to restrict the abilities of the theory to a far ex-
tent.6 Similar to Laplace, Jeffreys is more used to
handling equal probability finite sets than continu-
ous sets and the extension to continuous settings is
unorthodox, using, for instance, Dedekind’s sections
and putting several meanings under the notation dx.
Given the convoluted derivation of conditional prob-
abilities in this context, the book states the product
rule P (qr|p) = P (q|p)P (r|qp) as an axiom, rather
than as a consequence of the basic probability ax-
ioms. It leads (in Section 1.22) to Bayes’ theorem,
5Jeffreys’s Theory of Probability strongly differs from the
earlier Scientific Inference (1931) in this respect, the latter be-
ing rather dismissive of the mathematical difficulty: To make
this integral equal to 1 we should therefore have to include
a zero factor unless very small and very large values are ex-
cluded. This does appear to be the case (Section 5.43, page
67).
6This difficulty with handling σ-finite measures and contin-
uous variables will be recurrent throughout the book: Jeffreys
does not seem to be adverse to normalizing an improper dis-
tribution by ∞, even though the corresponding derivations
are not meaningful.
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namely, that, for all events qr,
P (qr|pH)∝ P (qr|H)P (p|qrH),
where H denotes the information available and p a
set of observations. In this (modern) format P (p|qrH)
is identified as Fisher likelihood and P (qr|H) as the
prior probability. Bayes’ theorem is defined as the
principle of inverse probability and only for finite
sets, rather than for measures.7 Obviously, the gen-
eral version of Bayes’ theorem is used in the sequel
for continuous parameter spaces.
Section 1.3 represents one of the few forays of
the book into the realm of decision theory,8 in con-
nection with Laplace’s notions of mathematical and
moral expectations, and with Bernoulli’s Saint Pe-
tersburg paradox, but there is no recognition of the
central role of the loss function in defining an opti-
mal Bayes rule as formalized later by Wald (1950)
and Raiffa and Schlaifer (1961). The attribution of
a decision-theoretic background to T. Bayes himself
is surprising, since there is not anything close to the
notion of loss or of benefit in Bayes’ (1763) origi-
nal paper. We nonetheless find there the seed of an
idea later developed in Rubin (1987), among oth-
ers, that prior and loss function are indistinguish-
able. [Section 1.8 briefly re-enters this perspective
to point out that (posterior) expectations are often
nowhere near the actual value of the random quan-
tity.] The next section (Section 1.4) is important in
that it tackles for the first time the issue of nonin-
formative priors. When the number of alternatives
is finite, Jeffreys picks the uniform prior as his non-
informative prior, following Laplace’s Principle of
Insufficient Reason. The difficulties associated with
this choice in continuous settings are not mentioned
at this stage.
2.4 More Axiomatics and Some Asymptotics
Section 1.5 attempts an axiomatic derivation that
the Bayesian principles just stated follow the rules
7As noted by Fienberg (2006), the adjective term
“Bayesian” had not yet appeared in the statistical literature
by the time Theory of Probability was published, and Jeffreys
sticks to the 19th century denomination of “inverse probabil-
ity.” The adjective can be traced back to either Ronald Fisher,
who used it in a rather derogatory meaning, or to Abraham
Wald, who gave it a more complimentary meaning in Wald
(1950).
8The reference point estimator advocated by Jeffreys (if
any) seems to be the maximum a posteriori (MAP) estimator,
even though he stated in his discussion of Lindley (1953) that
he deprecated the whole idea of picking out a unique estimate.
imposed earlier. This part does not bring much nov-
elty, once the fundamental properties of a proba-
bility distribution are stated. This is basically the
purpose of this section, where earlier “Axioms” are
checked in terms of the posterior probability P (·|pH).
A reassuring consequence of this derivation is that
the use of a posterior probability as the basis for
inference cannot lead to inconsistency. The use of
the posterior as a new prior for future observations
and the corresponding learning principle are devel-
oped at this stage. The debate about the choice of
the prior distribution is postponed till later, while
the issue of the influence of this prior distribution
is dismissed as having very little difference [on] the
results, which needs to be quantified, as in the quote
below at the beginning of Section 5.
Given the informal approach to (or rather with-
out) measure theory adopted in Theory of Probabil-
ity, the study of the limiting behavior of posterior
distributions in Section 1.6 does not provide much
insight. For instance, the fact that
P (q|p1 · · ·pnH)
=
P (q|H)
P (p1|H)P (p2|p1H) · · ·P (pn|p1 · · ·pn−1H)
is shown to induce that P (pn|p1 · · ·pn−1H) converges
to 1 is not particularly surprising, although it relates
to Laplace’s principle that repeated verifications of
consequences of a hypothesis will make it practically
certain that the next consequence will be verified. It
would have been equally interesting to focus on cases
in which P (q|p1 · · ·pnH) goes to 1.
The end of Section 1.62 introduces some quanti-
ties of interest, such as the distinction between esti-
mation problems and significance tests, but with no
clear guideline: when comparing models of complex-
ity m (this quantity being only defined for differen-
tial equations), Jeffreys suggests using prior prob-
abilities that are penalized by m, such as 2−m or
6/pi2m2, the motivation for those specific values be-
ing that the corresponding series converge. Penal-
ization by the model complexity is quite an inter-
esting idea, to be formalized later by, for example,
Rissanen (1983, 1990), but Jeffreys somehow kills
this idea before it is hatched by pointing out the
difficulties with the definition of m.
Instead, Jeffreys switches to a completely different
(if paramount) topic by defining in a few lines the
Bayes factor for testing a point null hypothesis,
K =
P (q|θH)
P (q′|θH)
/ P (q|H)
P (q′|H) ,
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where θ denotes the data. He suggests using P (q|H) =
1/2 as a default value, except for sequences of em-
bedded hypotheses for which he suggests
P (q|H)
P (q′|H) = 2,
presumably because the series with leading term 2−n
is converging.
Once again, the rather quick coverage of this ma-
terial is somehow frustrating, as further justifica-
tions would have been necessary for the choice of
the constant and so on.9 Instead, the chapter con-
cludes with a discussion of the distinction between
“idealism” and “realism” that can be skipped for
most purposes.
3. CHAPTER II: DIRECT PROBABILITIES
The whole of the information contained in the
observations that is relevant to the posterior
probabilities of different hypotheses is summed
up in the values that they give to the likelihood.
H. Jeffreys, Theory of Probability, Section 2.0.
This chapter is certainly the least “Bayesian” chap-
ter of the book, since it covers both the standard
sampling distributions and some equally standard
probability results. It starts with a reminder that
the principle of inverse probability can be stated in
the form
Posterior Probability ∝ Prior Probability
· Likelihood ,
thus rephrasing Bayes’ theorem in terms of the like-
lihood and with the proper indication that the rel-
evant information contained in the observations is
summarized by the likelihood (sufficiency will be
mentioned later in Section 3.7). Then follows (still
in Section 2.0) a long paragraph about the tenta-
tive nature of models, concluding that a statistical
model must be made part of the prior information
H before it can be tested against the observations,
which (presumably) relates to the fact that Bayesian
9Similarly, the argument against philosophers that main-
tain that no method based on the theory of probability can give
a (...) non-zero probability to a precise value against a contin-
uous background is not convincing as stated. The distinction
between zero measure events and mixture priors including a
Dirac mass should have been better explained, since this is
the basis for Bayesian point-null testing.
model assessment must involve a description of the
alternative(s) to be validated.
The main bulk of the chapter is about sampling
distributions. Section 2.1 introduces binomial and
hypergeometric distributions at length, including the
interesting problem of deciding between binomial
versus negative binomial experiments when faced
with the outcome of a survey, used later in the de-
fence of the Likelihood Principle (Berger andWolpert,
1988). The description of the binomial contains the
equally interesting remark that a given coin repeat-
edly thrown will show a bias toward head or tail due
to the wear, a remark later exploited in Diaconis and
Ylvisaker (1985) to justify the use of mixtures of
conjugate priors. Bernoulli’s version of the Central
Limit theorem is also recalled in this section, with
no particular appeal if one considers that a mod-
ern Statistics course (see, e.g., Casella and Berger,
2001) would first start with the probabilistic back-
ground.10
The Poisson distribution is first introduced as a
limiting distribution for the binomial distribution
B(n,p) when n is large and np is bounded. (Connec-
tions with radioactive disintegration are mentioned
afterward.) The normal distribution is proposed as
a large sample approximation to a sum of Bernoulli
random variables. As for the other distributions,
there is some attempt at justifying the use of the
normal distribution, as well as [what we find to be]
a confusing paragraph about the “true” and “actual
observed” values of the parameters. A long section
(Section 2.3) expands about the properties of Pear-
son’s distributions, then allowing Jeffreys to intro-
duce the negative binomial as a mixture of Poisson
distributions. The introduction of the bivariate nor-
mal distribution is similarly convoluted, using first
binomial variates and second a limiting argument,
and without resorting to matrix formalism.
Section 2.6 attempts to introduce cumulative dis-
tribution functions in a more formal manner, using
the current three-step definition, but again dealing
with limits in an informal way. Rather coherently
from a geophysicist’s point of view, characteristic
functions are also covered in great detail, including
connections with moments and the Cauchy distribu-
tion, as well as Le´vy’s inversion theorem. The main
10In fact, some of the statements in Theory of Probability
that surround the statement of the Central Limit theorem are
not in agreement with measure theory, as, for instance, the
confusion between pointwise and uniform convergence, and
convergence in probability and convergence in distribution.
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goal of using characteristic functions seems nonethe-
less to be able to establish the Central Limit theo-
rem in its full generality (Section 2.664).
Rather surprisingly for a Bayesian reference book
and mostly in complete disconnection with the test-
ing chapters, the χ2 test of goodness of fit is given a
large and uncritical place within this book, includ-
ing an adjustment for the degrees of freedom.11 Ex-
amples include the obvious independence of a rect-
angular contingency table. The only criticism (Sec-
tion 2.76) is fairly obscure in that it blames poor
performances of the χ2 test on the fact that all di-
vergences in the χ2 sum are equally weighted. The
test is nonetheless implemented in the most classi-
cal manner, namely, that the hypothesis is rejected
if the χ2 statistic is outside the standard interval.
It is unclear from the text in Section 2.76 that re-
jection would occur were the χ2 statistic too small,
even though Jeffreys rightly addresses the issue at
the end of Chapter 5 (Section 5.63). He also men-
tions the need to coalesce small groups into groups
of size at least 5 with no further justification. The
chapter concludes with similar uses of Student’s t
and Fisher’s z tests.
4. CHAPTER III: ESTIMATION PROBLEMS
If we have no information relevant to the actual
value of the parameter, the probability must be
chosen so as to express the fact that we have none.
H. Jeffreys, Theory of Probability, Section 3.1.
This is a major chapter of Theory of Probabil-
ity as it introduces both exponential families and
the principle of Jeffreys noninformative priors. The
main concepts are already present in the early sec-
tions, including some invariance principles. The pur-
pose of the chapter is stated as a point estimation
problem, where obtaining the probability distribu-
tion of [the] parameters, given the observations is
the goal. Note that estimation is not to be under-
stood in the (modern?) sense of point estimation,
that is, as a way to produce numerical substitutes
for the true parameters that are based on the data,
11Interestingly enough, the parameters are estimated by
minimum χ2 rather than either maximum likelihood or
Bayesian point estimates. This is, again, a reflection of the
practice of the time, coupled with the fact that most ap-
proaches are asymptotically indistinguishable. Posterior ex-
pectations are not at all advocated as Bayes (point) estima-
tors in Theory of Probability.
since the decision-theoretic perspective for building
(point) estimators is mostly missing from the book
(see Section 1.8 for a very brief remark on expecta-
tions). Both Good (1980) and Lindley (1980) stress
this absence.
4.1 Noninformative Priors of Former Days
Section 3.1 sets the principles for selecting nonin-
formative priors. Jeffreys recalls Laplace’s rule that,
if a parameter is real-valued, its prior probability
should be taken as uniformly distributed, while, if
this parameter is positive, the prior probability of its
logarithm should be taken as uniformly distributed.
The motivation advanced for using both priors is
the invariance principle, namely, the invariance of
the prior selection under several different sets of pa-
rameters. At this stage, there is no recognition of
a potential problem with using a σ-finite measure
and, in particular, with the fact that these priors
are not probability distributions, but rather a sim-
ple warning that these are formal rules expressing
ignorance. We face the difficulty mentioned earlier
when considering σ-finite measures since they are
not properly handled at this stage: when stating
that one starts with any distribution of prior proba-
bility, it is not possible to include σ-finite measures
this way, except via the [incorrect] argument that a
probability is merely a number and, thus, that the
total weight can be ∞ as well as 1: use ∞ instead
of 1 to indicate certainty on data H . The wrong in-
terpretation of a σ-finite measure as a probability
distribution (and of ∞ as a “number”) then leads
to immediate paradoxes, such as the prior proba-
bility of any finite range being null, which sounds
inconsistent with the statement that we know noth-
ing about the parameter, but this results from an
over-interpretation of the measure as a probability
distribution already pointed out by Lindley (1971,
1980) and Kass and Wasserman (1996).
The argument for using a flat (Lebesgue) prior is
based (a) on its use by both Bayes and Laplace in
finite or compact settings, and (b) on the argument
that it correctly reflects the absence of prior knowl-
edge about the value of the parameter. At this stage,
no point is made against it for reasons related with
the invariance principle—there is only one parame-
terization that coincides with a uniform prior—but
Jeffreys already argues that flat priors cannot be
used for significance tests, because they would al-
ways reject the point null hypothesis. Even though
Bayesian significance tests, including Bayes factors,
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have not yet been properly introduced, the notion
of an infinite mass canceling a point null hypothesis
is sufficiently intuitive to be used at this point.
While, indeed, using an improper prior is a ma-
jor difficulty when testing point null hypotheses be-
cause it gives an infinite mass to the alternative
(DeGroot, 1970), Jeffreys fails to identify the prob-
lem as such but rather blames the flat prior applied
to a parameter with a semi-infinite range of pos-
sible values. He then goes on justifying the use of
pi(σ) = 1/σ for positive parameters (replicating the
argument of Lhoste, 1923) on the basis that it is
invariant for the change of parameters % = 1/σ, as
well as any other power, failing to recognize that
other transforms that preserve positivity do not ex-
hibit such an invariance. One has to admit, however,
that, from a physicist’s perspective, power trans-
forms are more important than other mathematical
transforms, such as arctan, because they can be as-
signed meaningful units of measurement, while other
functions cannot. At least this seems to be the spirit
of the examples considered in Theory of Probability :
Some methods of measuring the charge of an elec-
tron give e, others e2.
There is a vague indication that Jeffreys may also
recognize pi(σ) = 1/σ as the scale group invariant
measure, but this is unclear. An indefensible argu-
ment follows, namely, that∫ a
0
vn dv
/∫ ∞
a
vn dv
is only indeterminate when n=−1, which allows us
to avoid contradictions about the lack of prior in-
formation. Jeffreys acknowledges that this does not
solve the problem since this choice implies that the
prior “probability” of a finite interval (a, b) is then
always null, but he avoids the difficulty by admit-
ting that the probability that σ falls in a particu-
lar range is zero, because zero probability does not
imply impossibility. He also acknowledges that the
invariance principle cannot encompass the whole
range of transforms without being inconsistent, but
he nonetheless sticks to the pi(σ) = 1/σ prior as it
is better than the Bayes–Laplace rule.12 Once again,
the argument sustaining the whole of Section 3.1 is
12In both the 19th and early 20th centuries, there is a tra-
dition within the not-yet-Bayesian literature to go to extreme
lengths in the justification of a particular prior distribution, as
if there existed one golden prior. See, for example, Broemeling
and Broemeling (2003) in this respect.
incomplete since missing the fundamental issue of
distinguishing proper from improper priors.
While Haldane’s (1932) prior on probabilities (or
rather on chances as defined in Section 1.7),
pi(p)∝ 1
p(1− p) ,
is dismissed as too extreme (and inconsistent), there
is no discussion of the main difficulty with this prior
(or with any other improper prior associated with a
finite-support sampling distribution), which is that
the corresponding posterior distribution is not de-
fined when x ∼ B(n,p) is either equal to 0 or to n
(although Jeffreys concludes that x = 0 leads to a
point mass at p = 0, due to the infinite mass nor-
malization).13 Instead, the corresponding Jeffreys’s
prior
pi(p)∝ 1√
p(1− p)
is suggested with little justification against the (truly)
uniform prior: we may as well use the uniform dis-
tribution.
4.2 Laplace’s Succession Rule
Section 3.2 contains a Bayesian processing of
Laplace’s succession rule, which is an easy introduc-
tion given that the parameter of the sampling dis-
tribution, a hypergeometric H(N,r), is an integer.
The choice of a uniform prior on r, pi(r) = 1/(N+1),
does not require much of a discussion and the pos-
terior distribution
pi(r|l,m,N,H) =
(
r
l
)(
N − r
m
)/(
N +1
l+m+ 1
)
is available in closed form, including the normal-
izing constant. The posterior predictive probability
that the next specimen will be of the same type is
then (l+1)/(l+m+1) and more complex predictive
probabilities can be computed as well. As in earlier
books involving Laplace’s succession rule, the sec-
tion argues about its truthfulness from a metaphys-
ical point of view (using classical arguments about
13Jeffreys (1931, 1937) does address the problem in a
clearer manner, stating that this is not serious, for so long
as the sample is homogeneous (meaning x = 0, n) the ex-
treme values (meaning p = 0,1) are still admissible, and we
do attach a high probability to the proposition is of one type;
while as soon as any exceptions are known the extreme values
are completely excluded and no infinity arises (Section 10.1,
page 195).
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the probabilities that the sun rising tomorrow and
that all swans are white that always seem to be as-
sociates themselves with this topic) but, more inter-
estingly, it then moves to introducing a point mass
on specific values of the parameter in preparation
for hypothesis testing. Namely, following a renewed
criticism of the uniform assessment via the fact that
P (r =N |l,m= 0,N,H)
P (r 6=N |l= n,N,H) =
l+ 1
N + 1
is too small, Jeffreys suggests setting aside a portion
2k of the prior mass for both extreme values r = 0
and r=N . This is indeed equivalent to using a point
mass on the null hypothesis of homogeneity of the
population. While mixed samples are independent
of the choice of k (since they exclude those extreme
values), a sample of the first type with l = n leads
to a posterior probability ratio of
P (r =N |l= n,N,H)
P (r 6=N |l= n,N,H) =
n+ 1
N − n
k
1− 2k
N − 1
1
,
which leads to the crucial question of the choice14 of
k. The ensuing discussion is not entirely convincing:
1
2 is too large,
1
4 is not unreasonable [but] too low in
this case. The alternative
k =
1
4
+
1
N +1
argues that the classification of possibilities [is] as
follows: (1) Population homogeneous on account of
some general rule. (2) No general rule but extreme
values to be treated on a level with others. This pro-
posal is mostly interesting for its bearing on the
continuous case, for, in the finite case, it does not
sound logical to put weight on the null hypothesis
(r = 0 and r =N ) within the alternative, since this
confuses the issue. (See Berger, Bernardo and Sun,
2009, for a recent reappraisal of this approach from
the point of view of reference priors.)
Section 3.3 seems to extend Laplace’s succession
rule to the case in which the class sampled consists
of several types, but it actually deals with the (much
more interesting) case of Bayesian inference for the
multinomial M(n;p1, . . . , pr) distribution, when us-
ing the Dirichlet D(1, . . . ,1) distribution as a prior.
Jeffreys recovers the Dirichlet D(x1 + 1, . . . , xr + 1)
14A prior weight of 2k = 1/2 is reasonable since it gives
equal probability to both hypotheses.
distribution as the posterior distribution and he de-
rives the predictive probability that the next member
will be of the first type as
(x1 +1)/
∑
i
xi + r.
There could be some connections there with the ir-
relevance of alternative hypotheses later (in time)
discussed in polytomous regression models (Gourie´roux
and Monfort, 1996), but they are well hidden. In any
case, the Dirichlet distribution is not invariant to the
introduction of new types.
4.3 Poisson Distribution
The processing of the estimation of the parameter
α of the Poisson distribution P(α) is based on the
[improper] prior pi(α)∝ 1/α, deemed to be the cor-
rect prior probability distribution for scale invariance
reasons. Given n observations from P(α) with sum
Sn, Jeffreys reproduces Haldane’s (1932) derivation
of the Gamma posterior Ga(Sn, n) and he notes that
Sn is a sufficient statistic, but does not make a gen-
eral property of it at this stage. (This is done in
Section 3.7.)
The alternative choice pi(α) ∝ 1/√α will be later
justified in Section 3.10 not as Jeffreys’s (invariant)
prior but as leading to a posterior defined for all
observations, which is not the case of pi(α) ∝ 1/α
when x= 0, a fact overlooked by Jeffreys. Note that
pi(α)∝ 1/α can nonetheless be advocated by Jeffreys
on the ground that the Poisson process derives from
the exponential distribution, for which α is a scale
parameter: e−αt represents the fraction of the atoms
originally present that survive after time t.
4.4 Normal Distribution
When the sampling variance σ2 of a normal model
N (µ,σ2) is known, the posterior distribution associ-
ated with a flat prior is correctly derived as µ|x1, . . . ,
xn ∼N (x¯, σ2/n) (with the repeated difficulty about
the use of a σ-finite measure as a probability). Under
the joint improper prior
pi(µ,σ)∝ 1/σ,
the (marginal) posterior on µ is obtained as a Stu-
dent’s t
T (n− 1, x¯, s2/n(n− 1))
distribution, while the marginal posterior on σ2 is
an inverse gamma IG((n− 1)/2, s2/2).15
15Section 3.41 also contains the interesting remark that,
conditional on two observations, x1 and x2, the posterior
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Jeffreys notices that, when n= 1, the above prior
does not lead to a proper posterior since pi(µ|x1)∝
1/|µ − x1| is not integrable, but he concludes that
the solution degenerates in the right way, which, we
suppose, is meant to say that there is not enough
information in the data. But, without further for-
malization, it is a delicate conclusion to make.
Under the same noninformative prior, the predic-
tive density of a second sample with sufficient statis-
tic (x¯2, s2) is found
16 to be proportional to{
n1s
2
1+ n2s
2
2+
n1n2
n1+ n2
(x¯2 − x¯1)2
}−(n1+n2−1)/2
.
A direct conclusion is that this implies that x¯2 and
s2 are dependent for the predictive, if independent
given µ and σ, while the marginal predictives on x¯2
and s22 are Student’s t and Fisher’s z, respectively.
Extensions to the prediction of multiple future sam-
ples with the same (Section 3.43) or with different
(Section 3.44) means follow without surprise. In the
latter case, given m samples of nr (1≤ r ≤m) nor-
mal N (µi, σ2) measurements, the posterior on σ2
under the noninformative prior
pi(µ1, . . . , µr, σ)∝ 1/σ
is again an inverse gamma IG(ν/2, s2/2) distribu-
tion,17 with s2 =
∑
r
∑
i(xri − x¯r)2 and ν =
∑
r nr,
while the posterior on t=
√
ni(µi − x¯i)/s is a Stu-
dent’s t with ν degrees of freedom for all i’s (no
matter what the number of observations within this
group is). Figure 1 represents the posteriors on the
means µi for the data set analyzed in this section on
seven sets of measurements of the gravity. A para-
probability that µ is between both observations is exactly 1/2.
Jeffreys attributes this property to the fact that the scale σ is
directly estimated from those two observations under a nonin-
formative prior. Section 3.8 generalizes the observation to all
location-scale families with median equal to the location. Oth-
erwise, the posterior probability is less than 1/2. Similarly, the
probability that a third observation x3 will be between x1 and
x2 is equal to 1/3 under the predictive. While Jeffreys gives
a proof by complete integration, this is a direct consequence
of the exchangeability of x1, x2 and x3. Note also that this is
one of the rare occurrences of a credible interval in the book.
16In the current 1961 edition, n2s
2
2 is mistakenly typed as
n22s
2
2 in equation (6) of Section 3.42.
17Jeffreys does not use the term “inverse gamma distribu-
tion” but simply notes that this is a distribution with a scale
parameter that is given by a single set of tables (for a given ν).
He also notices that the distribution of the transform log(σ/s)
is closer to a normal distribution than the original.
Fig. 1. Seven posterior distributions on the values of accel-
eration due to gravity (in cm/sec2) at locations in East Africa
when using a noninformative prior.
graph in Section 3.44 contains hints about hierar-
chical Bayes modeling as a way of strengthening es-
timation, which is a perspective later advanced in
favor of this approach (Lindley and Smith, 1972;
Berger and Robert, 1990).
The extension in Section 3.5 to the setting of the
normal linear regression model should be simple (see,
e.g., Marin and Robert, 2007, Chapter 3), except
that the use of tensorial conventions—like when a
suffix i is repeated it is to be given all values from 1
to m—and the absence of matrix notation makes the
reading quite arduous for today’s readers.18 Because
of this lack of matrix tools, Jeffreys uses an implicit
diagonalization of the regressor matrix XTX (with
modern notation) and thus expresses the posterior
in terms of the transforms ξi of the regression co-
efficients βi. This section is worth reading if only
to realize the immense advantage of using matrix
notation. The case of regression equations
yi =Xiβ + εi, εi ∼N (0, σ2i ),
with different unknown variances leads to a poly-
t output (Bauwens, 1984) under a noninformative
prior, which is deemed to be a complication, and
Jeffreys prefers to revert to the case when σ2i = ωiσ
2
with known ωi’s.
19 The final part of this section
18Using the notation ci for yi, xi for βi, yi for βˆi and air
for xir certainly makes reading this part more arduous.
19Sections 3.53 and 3.54 detail the numerical resolution of
the normal equations by iterative methods and have no real
bearing on modern Bayesian analysis.
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mentions the interesting subcase of estimating a nor-
mal mean α when truncated at α = 0: negative ob-
servations do not need to be rejected since only the
posterior distribution has to be truncated in 0. [In
a similar spirit, Section 3.6 shows how to process a
uniform U(α−σ,α+σ) distribution under the non-
informative pi(α,σ) = 1/σ prior.]
Section 3.9 examines the estimation of a two-dimen-
sional covariance matrix
Θ =
(
σ2 %στ
%στ τ2
)
under centred normal observations. The prior advo-
cated by Jeffreys is pi(τ, σ, %)∝ 1/τσ, leading to the
(marginal) posterior
pi(%|%ˆ, n)
∝
∫ ∞
0
(1− %2)n/2
(coshβ − %%ˆ)n dβ
=
(1− %2)n/2
(1− %%ˆ)n−1/2
·
∫ 1
0
(1− u)n−1√
2u
{1− (1 + %%ˆ)u/2}−1/2 du
that only depends on %ˆ. (Jeffreys notes that, when σ
and τ are known, the posterior of % also depends on
the empirical variances for both components. This
paradoxical increase in the dimension of the suffi-
cient statistics when the number of parameters is de-
creasing is another illustration of the limited mean-
ing of marginal sufficient statistics pointed out by
Basu, 1988.) While this integral can be computed
via confluent hypergeometric functions (Gradshteyn
and Ryzhik, 1980),∫ 1
0
(1− x)n−1√
u(1− au) du
=B(1/2, n)2F1{1/2,1/2;n+ 1/2; (1 + %%ˆ)/2},
the corresponding posterior is certainly less manage-
able than the inverse Wishart that would result from
a power prior |Θ|γ on the matrix Θ itself. The ex-
tension to noncentred observations with flat priors
on the means induces a small change in the outcome
in that
pi(%|%ˆ, n)∝ (1− %
2)(n−1)/2
(1− %%ˆ)n−3/2
·
∫ 1
0
(1− u)n−2√
2u
· {1− (1 + %%ˆ)u/2}−1/2 du,
which is also the posterior obtained directly from the
distribution of %ˆ. Indeed, the sampling distribution
is given by
f(%ˆ|%) = n− 2√
2pi
(1− %ˆ2)(n−4)/2
· (1− %2)(n−1)/2 Γ(n− 1)
Γ(n− 1/2)
· (1− %%ˆ)−(n−3/2)
· 2F1{1/2,1/2;n− 1/2; (1 + %%ˆ)/2}.
There is thus no marginalization paradox (Dawid,
Stone and Zidek, 1973) for this prior selection, while
one occurs for the alternative choice pi(τ, σ, %)∝ 1/τ2σ2.
4.5 Sufficiency and Exponential Families
Section 3.7 generalizes20 observations made pre-
viously about sufficient statistics for particular dis-
tributions (Poisson, multinomial, normal, uniform).
If there exists a sufficient statistic T (x) when x ∼
f(x|α), the posterior distribution on α only depends
on T (x) and on the number n of observations.21 The
generic form of densities from exponential families
log f(x|α) = (x−α)µ′(α) + µ(α) +ψ(x)
is obtained by a convoluted argument of imposing x¯
as the MLE of α, which is not equivalent to requiring
x¯ to be sufficient. The more general formula
f(x|α1, . . . , αm)
= φ(α1, . . . , αm)ψ(x) exp
m∑
s=1
us(α)vs(x)
is provided as a consequence of the (then very re-
cent) Pitman–Koopman[–Darmois] theorem22 on the
necessary and sufficient connection between the ex-
istence of fixed dimensional sufficient statistics and
exponential families. The theorem as stated does
not impose a fixed support on the densities f(x|α)
and this invalidates the necessary part, as shown
in Section 3.6 with the uniform distribution. It is
20Jeffreys’s derivation remains restricted to the unidimen-
sional case.
21Stating that n is an ancillary statistic is both formally
correct in Fisher’s sense (n does not depend on α) and am-
biguous from a Bayesian perspective since the posterior on α
depends on n.
22Darmois (1935) published a version (in French) of this
theorem in 1935, about a year before both Pitman (1936)
and Koopman (1936).
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only later in Section 3.6 that parameter-dependent
supports are mentioned, with an unclear conclusion.
Surprisingly, this section does not contain any in-
dication that the specific structure of exponential
families could be used to construct conjugate23 pri-
ors (Raiffa, 1968). This lack of connection with reg-
ular priors highlights the fully noninformative per-
spective advocated in Theory of Probability, despite
comments (within the book) that priors should re-
flect prior beliefs and/or information.
4.6 Predictive Densities
Section 3.8 contains the rather amusing and not
well-known result that, for any location-scale para-
metric family such that the location parameter is
the median, the posterior probability that the third
observation lies between the first two observations
is 1/2. This may be the first use of Bayesian predic-
tive distributions, that is, p(x3|x1, x2) in this case,
where parameters are integrated out. Such predic-
tive distributions cannot be properly defined in fre-
quentist terms; at best, one may take p(x3|θ = θˆ)
where θˆ is a plug-in estimator. Building more sen-
sible predictives seems to be one major appeal of
the Bayesian approach for modern practitioners, in
particular, econometricians.
4.7 Jeffreys’s Priors
Section 3.10 introduces Fisher information as a
quadratic approximation to distributional distances.
Given the Hellinger distance and the Kullback–
Leibler divergence,
d1(P,P
′) =
∫
|(dP )1/2 − (dP ′)1/2|2
and
d2(P,P
′) =
∫
log
dP
dP ′
d(P − P ′),
we have the second-order approximations
d1(Pα, Pα′)≈ 1
4
(α− α′)TI(α)(α−α′)
and
d2(Pα, Pα′)≈ (α− α′)TI(α)(α−α′),
where
I(α) = Eα
[
∂f(x|α)
∂α
∂f(x|α)T
∂α
]
23As pointed to us by Dennis Lindley, Section 1.7 comes
close to the concept of exchangeability when introducing
chances.
is Fisher information.24 A first comment of impor-
tance is that I(α) is equivariant under reparameter-
ization, because both distances are functional dis-
tances and thus invariant for all nonsingular trans-
formations of the parameters. Therefore, if α′ is a
(differentiable) transform of α,
I(α′) =
dα
dα′
I(α)
dαT
dα′
,
and this is the spot where Jeffreys states his general
principle for deriving noninformative priors (Jeffreys’s
priors):25
pi(α)∝ |I(α)|1/2
is thus an ideal prior in that it is invariant under
any (differentiable) transformation.
Quite curiously, there is no motivation for this
choice of priors other than invariance (at least at this
stage) and consistency (at the end of the chapter).
Fisher information is only perceived as a second or-
der approximation to two functional distances, with
no connection with either the curvature of the like-
lihood or the variance of the score function, and no
mention of the information content at the current
value of the parameter or of the local discriminating
power of the data. Finally, no connection is made
at this stage with Laplace’s approximation (see Sec-
tion 4.0). The motivation for centering the choice
of the prior at I(α) is thus uncertain. No mention
is made either of the potential use of those func-
tional distances as intrinsic loss functions for the
[point] estimation of the parameters (Le Cam, 1986;
Robert, 1996). However, the use of these intrinsic
divergences (measures of discrepancy) to introduce
I(α) as a key quantity seems to indicate that Jeffreys
understood I(α) as a local discriminating power of
the model and to some extent as the intrinsic fac-
tor used to compensate for the lack of invariance
of |α− α′|2. It corroborates the fact that Jeffreys’s
priors are known to behave particularly well in one-
dimensional cases.
Immediately, a problem associated with this generic
principle is spotted by Jeffreys for the normal distri-
bution N (µ,σ2). While, when considering µ and σ
24Jeffreys uses an infinitesimal approximation to derive
I(α) in Theory of Probability, which is thus not defined this
way, nor connected with Fisher.
25Obviously, those priors are not called Jeffreys’s priors in
the book but, as a counter-example to Steve Stigler’s law of
eponimy (Stigler, 1999), the name is now correctly associated
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separately, one recovers the invariance priors pi(µ)∝
1 and pi(σ)∝ 1/σ, Jeffreys’s prior on the pair (µ,σ)
is pi(µ,σ) ∝ 1/σ2. If, instead, m normal observa-
tions with the same variance σ2 were proposed, they
would lead to pi(µ1, . . . , µm, σ) ∝ 1/σm+1, which is
unacceptable (because it induces a growing depar-
ture from the true value as m increases). Indeed, if
one considers the likelihood
L(µ1, . . . , µm, σ)
∝ σ−mn exp− n
2σ2
m∑
i=1
{(x¯i − µi)2 + s2i },
the marginal posterior on σ is
σ−mn−1 exp− n
2σ2
m∑
i=1
s2i ,
that is,
σ−2 ∼Ga
{
(mn− 1)/2, n
∑
i
s2i /2
}
and
E[σ2] =
n
∑m
i=1 s
2
i
mn− 1
whose own expectation is
mn−m
mn− 1 σ
2
0 ,
if σ0 denotes the “true” standard deviation. If n is
small against m, the bias resulting from this choice
will be important.26 Therefore, in this special case,
Jeffreys proposes a departure from the general rule
by using pi(µ,σ) ∝ 1/σ. (There is a further men-
tion of difficulties with a large number of param-
eters when using one single scale parameter, with
the same solution proposed. There may even be an
indication about reference priors at this stage, when
stating that some transforms do not need to be con-
sidered.)
The arc-sine law on probabilities,
pi(p) =
1
pi
1√
p(1− p) ,
26As pointed out to us by Lindley (2008, private commu-
nication), Jeffreys expresses more clearly the difficulty that
the corresponding t distribution would always be [of index]
(n+ 1)/2, no matter how many true values were estimated,
that is, that the natural reduction of the degrees of freedom
with the number of nuisance parameters does not occur with
this prior.
is found to be the corresponding reference distribu-
tion, with a more severe criticism of the other dis-
tributions (see Section 4.1): both the usual rule and
Haldane’s rule are rather unsatisfactory. The corre-
sponding Dirichlet D(1/2, . . . ,1/2) prior is obtained
on the probabilities of a multinomial distribution.
Interestingly too, Jeffreys derives most of his priors
by recomputing the L2 or Kullback distance and by
using a second-order approximation, rather than by
following the genuine definition of the Fisher infor-
mation matrix. Because Jeffreys’s prior on the Pois-
son P(λ) parameter is pi(λ) ∝ 1/√λ, there is some
attempt at justification, with the mention that gen-
eral rules for the prior probability give a starting
point, that is, act like reference priors (Berger and
Bernardo, 1992).
In the case of the (normal) correlation coefficient,
the posterior corresponding to Jeffreys’s prior
pi(%, τ, σ) ∝ 1/τσ(1 − %2)3/2 is not properly defined
for a single observation, but Jeffreys does not ex-
pand on the generic improper nature of those prior
distributions. In an attempt close to defining a refer-
ence prior, he notices that, with both τ and σ fixed,
the (conditional) prior is
pi(%)∝
√
1 + %2
1− %2 ,
which, while improper, can also be compared to the
arc-sine prior
pi(%) =
1
pi
1√
1− %2 ,
which is integrable as is. Note that Jeffreys does not
conclude in favor of one of those priors: We cannot
really say that any of these rules is better than the
uniform distribution.
In the case of exponential families with natural
parameter β,
f(x|β) = ψ(x)φ(β) expβv(x),
Jeffreys does not take advantage of the fact that
Fisher information is available as a transform of φ,
indeed,
I(β) = ∂2 logφ(β)/∂β2,
but rather insists on the invariance of the distri-
bution under location-scale transforms, β = kβ′ +
l, which does not correctly account for potential
boundaries on β.
Somehow, surprisingly, rather than resorting to
the natural “Jeffreys’s prior,” pi(β) ∝ |∂2 logφ(β)/
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∂β2|1/2, Jeffreys prefers to use the “standard” flat,
log-flat and symmetric priors depending on the range
of β. He then goes on to study the alternative of
defining the noninformative prior via the mean pa-
rameterization suggested by Huzurbazar (see Huzur-
bazar, 1976),
µ(β) =
∫
v(x)f(x|β)dx.
Given the overall invariance of Jeffreys’s priors, this
should not make any difference, but Jeffreys chooses
to pick priors depending on the range of µ(β). For
instance, this leads him once again to promote the
Dirichlet D(1/2,1/2) prior on the probability p of
a binomial model if considering that log p/(1 − p)
is unbounded,27 and the uniform prior if consider-
ing that µ(p) = np varies on (0,∞). It is interesting
to see that, rather than sticking to a generic prin-
ciple inspired by the Fisher information that Jef-
freys himself recognizes as consistent and that offers
an almost universal range of applications, he resorts
to group invariant (Haar) measures when the rule,
though consistent, leads to results that appear to dif-
fer too much from current practice.
We conclude with a delicate example that is found
within Section 3.10. Our interpretation of a set of
quantitative laws φr with chances αr [such that] if φr
is true, the chance of a variable x being in a range
dx is fr(x,αr1, . . . , αrn)dx is that of a mixture of
distributions,
x∼
m∑
r=1
αrfr(x,αr1, . . . , αrn).
Because of the complex shape (convex combination)
of the distribution, the Fisher information is not
readily available and Jeffreys suggests assigning a
reference prior to the weights (α1, . . . , αm), that is,
a Dirichlet D(1/2, . . . ,1/2), along with separate ref-
erence priors on the αrs. Unfortunately, this leads
to an improper posterior density (which integrates
to infinity). In fact, mixture models do not allow for
independent improper priors on their components
(Marin, Mengersen and Robert, 2005).
5. CHAPTER IV: APPROXIMATE METHODS
AND SIMPLIFICATIONS
The difference made by any ordinary change of the
prior probability is comparable with the effect
27There is another typo when stating that log p/(1 − p)
ranges over (0,∞).
of one extra observation.
H. Jeffreys, Theory of Probability, Section 4.0.
As in Chapter II, many points of this chapter are
outdated by modern Bayesian practice. The main
bulk of the discussion is about various approxima-
tions to (then) intractable quantities or posteriors,
approximations that have limited appeal nowadays
when compared with state-of-the-art computational
tools. For instance, Sections 4.43 and 4.44 focus on
the issue of grouping observations for a linear regres-
sion problem: if data is gathered modulo a round-
ing process [or if a polyprobit model is to be esti-
mated (Marin and Robert, 2007)], data augmenta-
tion (Tanner and Wong, 1987; Robert and Casella,
2004) can recover the original values by simulation,
rather than resorting to approximations. Mentions
are made of point estimators, but there is unfortu-
nately no connection with decision theory and loss
functions in the classical sense (DeGroot, 1970; Berger,
1985). A long section (Section 4.7) deals with rank
statistics, containing apparently no connection with
Bayesian Statistics, while the final section (Section 4.9)
on randomized designs also does not cover the spe-
cial issue of randomization within Bayesian Statis-
tics (Berger and Wolpert, 1988).
The major components of this chapter in terms
of Bayesian theory are an introduction to Laplace’s
approximation, although not so-called (with an in-
teresting side argument in favor of Jeffreys’s priors),
some comments on orthogonal parameterisation [un-
derstood from an information point of view] and the
well-known tramcar example.
5.1 Laplace’s Approximation
When the number of observations n is large, the
posterior distribution can be approximated by a Gaus-
sian centered at the maximum likelihood estimate
with a range of order n−1/2. There are numerous
instances of the use of Laplace’s approximation in
Bayesian literature (see, e.g., Berger, 1985; MacKay,
2002), but only with specific purposes oriented to-
ward model choice, not as a generic substitute. Jef-
freys derives from this approximation an incentive
to treat the prior probability as uniform since this
is of no practical importance if the number of obser-
vations is large. His argument is made more precise
through the normal approximation,
L(θ|x1, . . . , xn)
≈ L˜(θ|x)∝ exp{−n(θ− θˆ)TI(θˆ)(θ− θˆ)/2},
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to the likelihood. [Jeffreys notes that it is of trivial
importance whether I(θ) is evaluated for the actual
values or for the MLE θˆ.] Since the normalization
factor is
(n/2pi)m/2|I(θ)|1/2,
using Jeffreys’s prior pi(θ) ∝ |I(θ)|1/2 means that
the posterior distribution is properly normalized and
that the posterior distribution of θi − θˆi is nearly
the same (. . .) whether it is taken on data θˆi or
on θi. This sounds more like a pivotal argument in
Fisher’s fiducial sense than genuine Bayesian rea-
soning, but it nonetheless brings an additional ar-
gument for using Jeffreys’s prior, in the sense that
the prior provides the proper normalizing factor. Ac-
tually, this argument is much stronger than it first
looks in that it is at the very basis of the construc-
tion of matching priors (Welch and Peers, 1963). In-
deed, when considering the proper normalizing con-
stant (pi(θ)∝ |I(θ)|1/2), the agreement between the
frequentist distribution of the maximum likelihood
estimator and the posterior distribution of θ gets
closer by an order of 1.
5.2 Outside Exponential Families
When considering distributions that are not from
exponential families, sufficient statistics of fixed di-
mension do not exist, and the MLE is much harder
to compute. Jeffreys suggests in Section 4.1 using a
minimum χ2 approximation to overcome this diffi-
culty, an approach which is rarely used nowadays.
A particular example is the poly-t (Bauwens, 1984)
distribution
pi(µ|x1, . . . , xs)∝
s∏
r=1
{
1 +
(µ− xr)2
νrs2r
}−(νr+1)/2
that happens when several series of observations yield
independent estimates [xr] of the same true value
[µ]. The difficulty with this posterior can now be
easily solved via a Gibbs sampler that demarginal-
izes each t density.
Section 4.3 is not directly related to Bayesian Statis-
tics in that it is considering (best) unbiased esti-
mators, even though the Rao–Blackwell theorem is
somehow alluded to. The closest connection with
Bayesian Statistics could be that, once summary
statistics have been chosen for their availability, a
corresponding posterior can be constructed condi-
tional on those statistics.28 The present equivalent
28A side comment on the first-order symmetry between the
probability of a set of statistics given the parameters and that
of this proposal would then be to use variational
methods (Jaakkola and Jordan, 2000) or ABC tech-
niques (Beaumont, Zhang and Balding, 2002).
An interesting insight is given by the notion of
orthogonal parameters in Section 4.31, to be under-
stood as the choice of a parameterization such that
I(θ) is diagonal. This orthogonalization is central in
the construction of reference priors (Kass, 1989; Tib-
shirani, 1989; Berger and Bernardo, 1992; Berger,
Philippe and Robert, 1998) that are identical to Jef-
freys’s priors. Jeffreys indicates, in particular, that
full orthogonalization is impossible for m = 4 and
more dimensions.
In Section 4.42 the errors-in-variables model is
handled rather poorly, presumably because of com-
putational difficulties: when considering (1≤ r ≤ n)
yr = αξ + β + εr, xr = ξ + ε
′
r,
the posterior on (α,β) under standard normal errors
is
pi(α,β|(x1, y1), . . . , (xn, yx))
∝
n∏
r=1
(t2r +α
2s2r)
−1/2
· exp
{
−
n∑
r=1
(yr − αxr − β)2
2(t2r +α
2s2r)
}
,
which induces a normal conditional distribution on
β and a more complex t-like marginal posterior dis-
tribution on α that can still be processed by present-
day standards.
Section 4.45 also contains an interesting example
of a normal N (µ,σ2) sample when there is a known
contribution to the standard error, that is, when
σ2 > σ′2 with σ′ known. In that case, using a flat
prior on log(σ2 − σ′2) leads to the posterior
pi(µ,σ|x¯, s2, n)
∝ 1
σ2 − σ′2
1
σn−1
exp
[
− n
2σ2
{(µ− x¯)2 + s2}
]
,
which integrates out over µ to
pi(σ|s2, n)∝ 1
σ2 − σ′2
1
σn−2
exp
[
−ns
2
2σ2
]
.
The marginal obviously has an infinite mode (or
pole) at σ = σ′, but there can be a second (and
of the parameters given the statistics seems to precede the
first-order symmetry of the (posterior and frequentist) confi-
dence intervals established in Welch and Peers (1963).
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Fig. 2. Posterior distribution pi(σ|s2, n) for σ′ =√2, n= 15
and ns2 = 100, when using the prior pi(µ,σ) ∝ 1/σ (blue
curve) and the prior pi(µ,σ)∝ 1/σ2 − σ′2 (brown curve).
meaningful) mode if s2 is large enough, as illustrated
on Figure 2 (brown curve). The outcome is indeed
different from using the truncated prior pi(µ,σ) ∝
1/σ (blue curve), but to conclude that the infer-
ence using this assessment of the prior probability
would be that σ = σ′ is based once again on the false
premise that infinite mass posteriors act like Dirac
priors, which is not correct: since pi(σ|s2, n) does not
integrate over σ = σ′, the posterior is simply not de-
fined.29 In that sense, Jeffreys is thus right in reject-
ing this prior choice as absurd.
5.3 The Tramcar Problem
This chapter contains (in Section 4.8) the now
classical “tramway problem” of Newman, about a
man traveling in a foreign country [who] has to change
trains at a junction, and goes into the town, the exis-
tence of which he has only just heard. He has no idea
of its size. The first thing that he sees is a tramcar
numbered 100. What can he infer about the num-
ber of tramcars in the town? It may be assumed that
they are numbered consecutively from 1 upwards.
This is another illustration of the standard non-
informative prior for a scale, that is, pi(n) ∝ 1/n,
where n is the number of tramcars; the posterior
satisfies pi(n|m= 100)∝ 1/n2I(n≥ 100) and
P(n> n0|m) =
∞∑
r=n0+1
r−2
/ ∞∑
r=m
r−2 ≈ m
n0
.
29For an example of a constant MAP estimator, see Robert
(2001, Example 4.2).
Therefore, the posterior median (the justification
of which as a Bayes estimator is not included) is
approximately 2m. Although this point is not dis-
cussed by Jeffreys, this example is often mentioned
in support of the Bayesian approach against the
MLE, since the corresponding maximum estimator
of n is m, always below the true value of n, while
the Bayes estimator takes a more reasonable value.
6. CHAPTER V: SIGNIFICANCE TESTS: ONE
NEW PARAMETER
The essential feature is that we express ignorance
of whether the new parameter is needed by taking
half the prior probability for it as concentrated in
the value indicated by the null hypothesis and
distributing the other half over the range possible.
H. Jeffreys, Theory of Probability, Section 5.0.
This chapter (as well as the following one) is con-
cerned with the central issue of testing hypotheses,
the title expressing a focus on the specific case of
point null hypotheses: Is the new parameter sup-
ported by the observations, or is any variation ex-
pressible by it better interpreted as random?30 The
construction of Bayes factors as natural tools for
answering such questions does require more math-
ematical rigor when dealing with improper priors
than what is found in Theory of Probability. Even
though it can be argued that Jeffreys’s solution (us-
ing only improper priors on nuisance parameters) is
acceptable via a limiting argument (see also Berger,
Pericchi and Varshavsky, 1998, for arguments based
on group invariance), the specific and delicate fea-
ture of using infinite mass measures would deserve
more validation than what is found there. The dis-
cussion on the choice of priors to use for the param-
eters of interest is, however, more rewarding since
Jeffreys realizes that (point estimation) Jeffreys’s
priors cannot be used in this setting (because of
their improperness) and that an alternative class of
(testing) Jeffreys’s priors needs to be introduced. It
seems to us that this second type of Jeffreys’s pri-
ors has been overlooked in the subsequent literature,
even though the specific case of the Cauchy prior
is often pointed out as a reference prior for testing
point null hypotheses involving location parameters.
30The formulation of the question restricts the test to em-
bedded hypotheses, even though Section 5.7 deals with nor-
mality tests.
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6.1 Model Choice Formalism
Jeffreys starts by analyzing the question,
In what circumstances do observations sup-
port a change of the form of the law it-
self?,
from a model-choice perspective, by assigning
prior probabilities to the models Mi that are in
competition, pi(Mi) (i = 1,2, . . .). He further con-
strains those probabilities to be terms of a conver-
gent series.31 When checking back in Chapter I (Sec-
tion 1.62), it appears that this condition is due to the
constraint that the probabilities can be normalized
to 1, which sounds like an unnecessary condition if
dealing with improper priors at the same time.32
The consequence of this constraint is that pi(Mi)
must decrease like 2−i or i−2 and it thus (a) pre-
vents the use of equal probabilities advocated before
and (b) imposes an ordering of models.
Obviously, the use of the Bayes factor eliminates
the impact of this choice of prior probabilities, as
it does for the decomposition of an alternative hy-
pothesis H1 into a series of mutually irrelevant alter-
native hypotheses. The fact that m alternatives are
tested at once induces a Bonferroni effect, though,
that is not (correctly) taken into account at the be-
ginning of Section 5.04 (even if Jeffreys notes that
the Bayes factor is then multiplied by 0.7m). The
following discussion borders more on “ranking and
selection” than on testing per se, although the use
of Bayes factors with correction factor m or m2 is
the proposed solution. It is only at the end of Sec-
tion 5.04 that the Bonferroni effect of repeated test-
ing is properly recognized, if not correctly solved
from a Bayesian point of view.
If the hypothesis to be tested is H0 : θ = 0, against
the alternative H1 that is the aggregate of other pos-
sible values [of θ], Jeffreys initiates one of the major
advances of Theory of Probability by rewriting the
prior distribution as a mixture of a point mass in
θ = 0 and of a generic density pi on the range of θ,
pi(θ) = 12I0(θ) +
1
2pi(θ).
31The perspective of an infinite sequence of models under
comparison is not pursued further in this chapter.
32In Jeffreys (1931), Jeffreys puts forward a similar argu-
ment that it is impossible to construct a theory of quantitative
inference on the hypothesis that all general laws have the same
prior probability (Section 4.3, page 43). See Earman (1992) for
a deeper discussion of this point.
This is indeed a stepping stone for Bayesian Statis-
tics in that it explicitly recognizes the need to sep-
arate the null hypothesis from the alternative hy-
pothesis within the prior, lest the null hypothesis
is not properly weighted once it is accepted. The
overall principle is illustrated for a normal setting,
x ∼ N (θ,σ2) (with known σ2), so that the Bayes
factor is
K =
pi(H0|x)
pi(H1|x)
/pi(H0)
pi(H1)
=
exp{−x2/2σ2}∫
f(θ) exp{−(x− θ)2/2σ2}dθ .
The numerical calibration of the Bayes factor is not
directly addressed in the main text, except via a
qualitative divergence from the neutral K = 1. Ap-
pendix B provides a grading of the Bayes factor, as
follows:
• Grade 0. K > 1. Null hypothesis supported.
• Grade 1. 1 > K > 10−1/2. Evidence against H0,
but not worth more than a bare mention.
• Grade 2. 10−1/2 >K > 10−1. Evidence against H0
substantial.
• Grade 3. 10−1 >K > 10−3/2. Evidence against H0
strong.
• Grade 4. 10−3/2 >K > 10−2. Evidence against H0
very strong.
• Grade 5. 10−2 >K >. Evidence against H0 deci-
sive.
The comparison with the χ2 and t statistics in this
appendix shows that a given value of K leads to an
increasing (in n) value of those statistics, in agree-
ment with Lindley’s paradox (see Section 6.3 below).
If there are nuisance parameters ξ in the model
(Section 5.01), Jeffreys suggests using the same prior
on ξ under both alternatives, pi0(ξ), resulting in the
general Bayes factor
K =
∫
pi0(ξ)f(x|ξ,0)dξ
/∫
pi0(ξ)pi1(θ|ξ)f(x|ξ, θ)dξ dθ,
where pi1(θ|ξ) is a conditional density. Note that Jef-
freys uses a normal model with Laplace’s approxi-
mation to end up with the approximation
K ≈ 1
pi1(θˆ|ξˆ)
√
ngθθ
2pi
exp
{
−1
2
ngθθθˆ
2
}
,
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where θˆ and ξˆ are the MLEs of θ and ξ, and where
gθθ is the component of the information matrix cor-
responding to θ (under the assumption of strong
orthogonality between θ and ξ, which means that
the MLE of ξ is identical in both situations). The
low impact of the choice of pi0 on the Bayes fac-
tor may be interpreted as a licence to use improper
priors on the nuisance parameters despite difficul-
ties with this approach (DeGroot, 1973). An inter-
esting feature of this proposal is that the nuisance
parameters are processed independently under both
alternatives/models but with the same prior, with
the consequence that it makes little difference to K
whether we have much or little information about
θ.33 When the nuisance parameters and the param-
eter of interest are not orthogonal, the MLEs ξˆ0 and
ξˆ1 differ and the approximation of the Bayes factor
is now
K ≈ pi0(ξˆ0)
pi0(ξˆ1)
1
pi1(θˆ|ξˆ1)
√
ngθθ
2pi
exp
{
−1
2
ngθθθˆ
2
}
,
which shows that the choice of pi0 may have an in-
fluence too.
6.2 Prior Modeling
In Section 5.02 Jeffreys perceives the difficulty in
using an improper prior on the parameter of interest
θ as a normalization problem. If one picks pi(θ) or
pi1(θ|ξ) as a σ-finite measure, the Bayes factor K is
undefined (rather than always infinite, as put for-
ward by Jeffreys when normalizing by ∞). He thus
imposes pi(θ) to be of any form whose integral con-
verges (to 1, presumably), ending up in the location
case34 suggesting a Cauchy C(0, σ2) prior as pi(θ).
The first example fully processed in this chapter is
the innocuous B(n,p) model with H0 :p= p0, which
leads to the Bayes factor
K =
(n+ 1)!
x!(n− x)!p
x
0(1− p0)n−x(1)
under the uniform prior. While K = 1 is recognized
as a neutral value, no scaling or calibration of K
33The requirement that ξ′ = ξ when θ = 0 (where ξ′ denotes
the nuisance parameter under H1) seems at first meaningless,
since each model is processed independently, but it could sig-
nify that the parameterization of both models must be the
same when θ = 0. Otherwise, assuming that some parame-
ters are the same under both models is a source of contention
within the Bayesian literature.
34Note that the section seems to consider only location pa-
rameters.
is mentioned at this stage for reaching a decision
about H0 when looking at K. The only comment
worth noting there is that K is not very decisive
for small values of n: we cannot get decisive results
one way or the other from a small sample (without
adopting a decision framework). The next example
still sticks to a compact parameter space, since it
deals with the 2× 2 contingency table. The null hy-
pothesis H0 is that of independence between both
factors, H0 :p11p22 = p12p21. The reparameterization
in terms of the margins is
1 2
1 αβ + γ α(1− β)− γ
2 (1−α)β − γ (1−α)(1− β) + γ
but, in order to simplify the constraint
−min{αβ, (1−α)(1− β)}
≤ γ ≤min{α(1− β), (1−α)β},
Jeffreys then assumes that α ≤ β ≤ 1/2 via a mere
rearrangement of the table. In this case, pi(γ|α,β) =
1/α over (−αβ,α(1 − β)). Unfortunately, this as-
sumption (of being able to rearrange) is not realistic
when α and β are unknown and, while the author
notes that in ranges where α is not the smallest, it
must be replaced in the denominator [of pi(γ|α,β)]
by the smallest, the subsequent derivation keeps us-
ing the constraint α≤ β ≤ 1/2 and the denominator
α in the conditional distribution of γ, acknowledg-
ing later that an approximation has been made in
allowing α to range from 0 to 1 since α < β < 1/2.
Obviously, the motivation behind this crude approx-
imation is to facilitate the computation of the Bayes
factor,35 as
K ≈ (n1· +1)!n2·!n·1!n·2!
n11!n22!n12!n21!(n+ 1)!
(n+ 1)
if the data is
1 2
1 n11 n12 n1·
2 n21 n22 n2·
n·1 n·2 n
The computation of the (true) marginal associ-
ated with this prior (under H1) is indeed involved
35Notice the asymmetry in n1· resulting from the approxi-
mation.
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Fig. 3. Comparison of a Monte Carlo approximation to the
Bayes factor for the 2 × 2 contingency table with Jeffreys’s
approximation, based on 103 randomly generated 2× 2 tables
and 104 generations from the prior.
and requires either formal or numerical machine-
based integration. For instance, massively simulat-
ing from the prior is sufficient to provide this ap-
proximation. As shown by Figure 3, the difference
between the Monte Carlo approximation and Jef-
freys’s approximation is not spectacular, even though
Jeffreys’s approximation appears to be always bi-
ased toward larger values, that is, toward the null
hypothesis, especially for the values of K larger than
1. In some occurrences, the bias is such that it means
acceptance versus rejection, depending on which ver-
sion of K is used.
However, if one uses instead a Dirichlet D(1,1,1,1)
prior on the original parameterization (p11, . . . , p22),
the marginal is (up to the multinomial coefficient)
the Dirichlet normalizing constant36
m1(n)∝ D(n11 +1, . . . , n22 +1)
D(1,1,1,1)
= 3!
(n+3)!
n11!n22!n12!n21!
,
so the (true) Bayes factor in this case is
K =
n1·!n2·!n·1!n·2!
((n+1)!)2
3!(n+3)!
n11!n22!n12!n21!
=
n1·!n2·!n·1!n·2!
n11!n22!n12!n21!
3!(n+3)(n+2)
(n+ 1)!
,
36Note that using a Haldane (improper) prior is impossible
in this case, since the normalizing constant cannot be elimi-
nated.
which is larger than Jeffreys’s approximation. A ver-
sion much closer to Jeffreys’s modeling is based on
the parameterization
1 2
1 αβ γ(1− β)
2 (1− α)β (1− γ)(1− β)
in which case α, β and γ are not constrained by one
another and a uniform prior on the three parameters
can be proposed. After straightforward calculations,
the Bayes factor is given by
K = (n+1)
n·1!n·2!(n1· + 1)!(n2· + 1)!
(n+ 1)!n11!n12!n21!n22!
,
which is very similar to Jeffreys’s approximation
since the ratio is (n2· + 1)/(n + 1). Note that the
alternative parameterization based on using
1 2
1 αβ αγ
2 (1−α)(1− β) (1−α)(1− γ)
with a uniform prior provides a different answer
(with ni·’s and n·i’s being inverted inK). Section 5.12
reprocesses the contingency table with one fixed mar-
gin, obtaining very similar outcomes.37
In the case of the comparison of two Poisson sam-
ples (Section 5.15), P(λ) and P(λ′), the null hy-
pothesis is H0 :λ/λ
′ = a/(1− a), with a fixed. This
suggests the reparameterization
λ= αβ, λ′ = (1−α)β′,
with H0 : α= a. This reparameterization appears to
be strongly orthogonal in that
K =
∫
pi(β)ax(1− a)x′βx+x′e−β dβ∫
pi(β)αx(1− α)x′βx+x′e−β dβ dα
=
ax(1− a)x′ ∫ pi(β)βx+x′e−β dβ∫
αx(1− α)x′ dα ∫ pi(β)βx+x′e−β dβ
=
ax(1− a)x′∫
αx(1− α)x′ dα =
(x+ x′ +1)!
x!x′!
ax(1− a)x′ ,
37An interesting example of statistical linguistics is pro-
cessed in Section 5.14, with the comparison of genders in
Welsh, Latin and German, with Freund’s psychoanalytic sym-
bols, whatever that means!, but the fact that both Latin and
German have neuters complicated the analysis so much for
Jeffreys that he did without the neuters, apparently unable
to deal with 3× 2 tables.
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for every prior pi(β), a rather unusual invariance
property! Note that, as shown by (1), it also cor-
responds to the Bayes factor for the distribution
of x conditional on x + x′ since this is a binomial
B(x+ x′, α) distribution. The generalization to the
Poisson case is therefore marginal since it still fo-
cuses on a compact parameter space.
6.3 Improper Priors Enter
The bulk of this chapter is dedicated to testing
problems connected with the normal distribution. It
offers an interesting insight into Jeffreys’s processing
of improper priors, in that both the infinite mass
and the lack of normalizing constant are not clearly
signaled as potential problems in the book.
In the original problem of testing the nullity of a
normal mean, when x1, . . . , xn ∼ N (µ,σ2), Jeffreys
uses a reference prior pi0(σ) ∝ σ−1 under the null
hypothesis and the same reference prior augmented
by a proper prior on µ under the alternative,
pi1(µ,σ)∝ 1
σ
pi11(µ/σ)
1
σ
,
where σ is used as a scale for µ. The Bayes factor is
then defined as
K =
∫ ∞
0
σ−n−1 exp
{
− n
2σ2
(x¯2 + s2)
}
dσ
/∫ ∞
0
∫ +∞
−∞
pi11(µ/σ)σ
−n−2
· exp
{
− n
2σ2
· [(x¯− µ)2 + s2]
}
dσ dµ
without any remark on the use of an improper prior
in both the numerator and the denominator.38 There
is therefore no discussion about the point of using an
improper prior on the nuisance parameters present
in both models, that has been defended later in,
for example, Berger, Pericchi and Varshavsky (1998)
with deeper arguments. The focus is rather on a ref-
erence choice for the proper prior pi11. Jeffreys notes
that, if pi11 is even, K = 1 when n= 1, and he forces
the Bayes factor to be zero when s2 = 0 and x¯ 6= 0,
38If we extrapolate from earlier remarks by Jeffreys, his
justification may be that the same normalizing constant
(whether or not it is finite) is used in both the numerator
and the denominator.
by a limiting argument that a null empirical vari-
ance implies that σ = 0 and thus that µ = x¯ 6= 0.
This constraint is equivalent to the denominator of
K diverging, that is,∫
f(v)vn−1 dv =∞.
A solution39 that works for all n≥ 2 is the Cauchy
density, f(v) = 1/pi(1 + v2), advocated as such40 a
reference prior by Jeffreys (while he criticizes the
potential use of this distribution for actual data).
While the numerator ofK is available in closed form,∫ ∞
0
σ−n−1 exp
{
− n
2σ2
(x¯2 + s2)
}
dσ
=
{
n
2
(x¯2 + s2)
}−n/2
Γ(n/2),
this is not the case for the denominator and Jeffreys
studies in Section 5.2 some approximations to the
Bayes factor, the simplest41 being
K ≈
√
piν/2(1 + t2/ν)−(ν+1)/2,
where ν = n− 1 and t=√νx¯/s (which is the stan-
dard t statistic with a constant distribution over ν
under the null hypothesis). Although Jeffreys does
not explicitly delve into this direction, this approx-
imation of the Bayes factor is sufficient to expose
Lindley’s paradox (Lindley, 1957), namely, that the
Bayes factorK, being equivalent to
√
piν/2 exp{−t2/2},
goes to ∞ with ν for a fixed value of t, thus high-
lighting the increasing discrepancy between the fre-
quentist and the Bayesian analyses of this testing
problem (Berger and Sellke, 1987). As pointed out
to us by Lindley (private communication), the para-
dox is sometimes called the Lindley–Jeffreys para-
dox, because this section clearly indicates that t in-
creases like (log ν)1/2 to keep K constant.
The correct Bayes factor can of course be approx-
imated by a Monte Carlo experiment, using, for in-
stance, samples generated as
σ−2 ∼ Ga
{
n+1
2
,
ns2
2
}
and µ|σ ∼N (x¯, σ2/n).
39There are obviously many other distributions that also
satisfy this constraint. The main drawback of the Cauchy pro-
posal is nonetheless that the scale of 1 is arbitrary, while it
clearly has an impact on posterior results.
40Cauchy random variables occur in practice as ratios of
normal random variables, so they are not completely implau-
sible.
41The closest to an explicit formula is obtained just before
Section 5.21 as a representation of K through a single integral
involving a confluent hypergeometric function.
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Fig. 4. Comparison of a Monte Carlo approximation to the
Bayes factor for the normal mean problem with Jeffreys’s ap-
proximation, based on 5×103 randomly generated normal suf-
ficient statistics with n= 10 and 104 Monte Carlo simulations
of (µ,σ).
The difference between the t approximation and the
true value of the Bayes factor can be fairly impor-
tant, as shown on Figure 4 for n = 10. As in Fig-
ure 3, the bias is always in the same direction, the
approximation penalizing H0 this time. Obviously,
as n increases, the discrepancy decreases. (The up-
per truncation on the cloud is a consequence of Jef-
freys’s approximation being bounded by
√
piν/2.)
The Cauchy prior on the mean is also a computa-
tional hindrance when σ is known: the Bayes factor
is then
K = exp{−nx¯2/2σ2}/( 1
piσ
∫ ∞
−∞
exp
{
− n
2σ2
(x¯− µ)2
}
dµ
1 + µ2/σ2
)
.
In this case, Jeffreys proposes the approximation
K ≈
√
2/pin
1
1 + x¯2/σ2
,
which is then much more accurate, as shown by Fig-
ure 5: the maximum ratio between the approximated
K and the value obtained by simulation is 1.15 for
n= 5 and the difference furthermore decreases as n
increases.
6.4 A Second Type of Jeffreys Priors
In Section 5.3 Jeffreys makes another general pro-
posal for the selection of proper priors under the
alternative hypothesis: Noticing that the Kullback
divergence is J(µ|σ) = µ2/σ2 in the normal case
Fig. 5. Monte Carlo approximation to the Bayes factor for
the normal mean problem with known variance, compared with
Jeffreys’s approximation, based on 106 Monte Carlo simula-
tions of µ, when n= 5.
above, he deduces that the Cauchy prior he proposed
on µ is equivalent to a flat prior on arctanJ1/2:
dµ
piσ(1 + µ2/σ2)
=
1
pi
dJ1/2
1 + J
=
1
pi
d{tan−1 J1/2(µ)},
and turns this coincidence into a general rule.42 In
particular, the change of variable from µ to J is
not one-to-one, so there is some technical difficulty
linked with this proposal: Jeffreys argues that J1/2
should be taken to have the same sign as µ but this
is not satisfactory nor applicable in general settings.
Obviously, the symmetrization will not always be
possible and correcting when the inverse tangents
do not range from −pi/2 to pi/2 can be done in many
ways, thus making the idea not fully compatible
with the general invariance principle at the core of
Theory of Probability. Note, however, that Jeffreys’s
idea of using a functional of the Kullback–Leibler
divergence (or of other divergences) as a reference
parameterisation for the new parameter has many
interesting applications. For instance, it is central to
the locally conic parameterization used by Dacunha-
Castelle and Gassiat (1999) for testing the number
of components in mixture models.
In the first case he examines, namely, the case of
the contingency table, Jeffreys finds that the cor-
responding Kullback divergence depends on which
42We were not aware of this rule prior to reading the book
and this second type of Jeffreys’s priors, judging from the
Bayesian literature, does not seem to have inspired many fol-
lowers.
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Fig. 6. Jeffreys’s reference density on log(σ/σ0) for the test
of H0 : σ = σ0.
Fig. 7. Ratio of a Monte Carlo approximation to the Bayes
factor for the normal variance problem and of Jeffreys’s ap-
proximation, when n= 10 (based on 104 simulations).
margins are fixed (as is well known, the Fisher in-
formation matrix is not fully compatible with the
Likelihood Principle, see Berger and Wolpert, 1988).
Nonetheless, this is an interesting insight that pre-
cedes the reference priors of Bernardo (1979): given
nuisance parameters, it derives the (conditional) prior
on the parameter of interest as the Jeffreys prior for
the conditional information. See Bayarri and Garcia-
Donato (2007) for a modern extension of this per-
spective to general testing problems.
In the case (Section 5.43) of testing whether a
[normal] standard error has a suggested value σ0
when observing ns2 ∼ Ga(n/2, σ2/2), the parame-
terization
σ = σ0e
ζ
leads to (modulo the improper change of variables)
J(ζ) = 2sinh2(ζ) and
1
pi
d tan−1 J1/2(ζ)
dζ
=
√
2cosh(ζ)
pi cosh(2ζ)
as a potential (and overlooked) prior on ζ = log(σ/
σ0).
43 The corresponding Bayes factor is not avail-
able in closed form since∫ ∞
−∞
cosh(ζ)
cosh(2ζ)
e−nζ exp{−ns2/2σ20e2ζ}dζ
=
∫ ∞
0
1 + u2
1 + u4
un exp
{
−ns
2
2
u2
}
du
cannot be analytically integrated, even though a
Monte Carlo approximation is readily computed. Fig-
ure 7 shows that Jeffreys’s approximation,
K ≈
√
pin/2
cosh(2 log s/σ0)
cosh(log s/σ0)
(s/σ0)
n
· exp{n(1− (s/σ0)2)/2},
is again fairly accurate since the ratio is at worst
0.9 for n= 10 and the difference decreases as n in-
creases.
The special case of testing a normal correlation co-
efficient H0 :ρ= ρ0 is not processed (in Section 5.5)
via this general approach but, based on arguments
connected with (a) the earlier difficulties in the con-
struction of an appropriate noninformative prior (Sec-
tion 4.7) and (b) the fact that J diverges for the null
hypothesis44 ρ=±1, Jeffreys falls back on the uni-
form U(−1,1) solution, which is even more convinc-
ing in that it leads to an almost closed-form solution
K =
2(1− ρ20)n/2/(1− ρρˆ)n−1/2∫ 1
−1(1− ρ2)n/2/(1− ρρˆ)n−1/2 dρ
.
Note that Jeffreys’s approximation,
K ≈
(
2n− 1
pi
)1/2 (1− ρ20)n/2(1− ρˆ2)(n−3)/2
(1− ρρˆ)n−1/2 ,
is quite reasonable in this setting, as shown by Fig-
ure 8, and also that the value of ρ0 has no influence
on the ratios of the approximations. The extension
43Note that this is indeed a probability density, whose
shape is given in Figure 6, despite the loose change of vari-
ables, because a missing 2 cancels with a missing 1/2!
44This choice of the null hypothesis is somehow unusual,
since, on the one hand, it is more standard to test for no
correlation, that is, ρ = 0, and, on the other hand, having
ρ = ±1 is akin to a unit-root test that, as we know today,
requires firmer theoretical background.
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Fig. 8. Ratio of a Monte Carlo approximation to the Bayes
factor for the normal variance problem and of Jeffreys’s ap-
proximation, when n = 10 and ρ0 = 0 (based on 10
4 simula-
tions).
to two samples in Section 5.51 (for testing whether
or not the correlation is the same) is not processed
in a symmetric way, with some uncertainty about
the validity of the expression for the Bayes factor:
a pseudo-common correlation is defined under the
alternative in accordance with the rule that the pa-
rameter ρ must appear in the statement of H1, but
normalizing constraints on ρ are not properly as-
sessed.45
A similar approach is adopted for the compari-
son of two correlation coefficients, with some quasi-
hierarchical arguments (see Section 6.5) for the defi-
nition of the prior under the alternative. Section 5.6
is devoted to a very specific case of correlation anal-
ysis that corresponds to our modern random effect
model. A major part of this section argues in fa-
vor of the model based on observations in various
fields, but the connection with the chapter is the
devising of a test for the presence of those random
effects. The model is then formalized as normal ob-
servations xr ∼N (µ, τ2+σ2/kr) (1≤ r≤m), where
kr denotes the number of observations within class
r and τ is the variance of the random effect. The
null hypothesis is therefore H0 : τ = 0. Even at this
stage, the development is not directly relevant, ex-
cept for approximation purposes, and the few lines
of discussion about the Bayes factor indicate that
the (testing) Jeffreys prior on τ should be in 1/τ2
45To be more specific, a normalizing constant c on the dis-
tribution of ρ2 that depends on ρ appears in the closed-form
expression of K, as, for instance, in equation (14).
for small τ2, without further specification. The (nu-
merical) complexity of the problem may explain why
Jeffreys differs from his usual processing, although
current computational tools obviously allow for a
complete processing (modulo the proper choice of a
prior on τ ) (see, e.g., Ghosh and Meeden, 1984).
Jeffreys also advocates using this principle for test-
ing a normal distribution against alternatives from
the Pearson family of distributions in Section 5.7,
but no detail is given as to how J is computed and
how the Bayes factor is derived. Similarly, for the
comparison of the Poisson distribution with the neg-
ative binomial distribution in Section 5.8, the form
of J is provided for the distance between the two
distributions, but the corresponding Bayes factor is
only given via a very crude approximation with no
mention of the corresponding priors.
In Section 5.9 the extension of the (regular) model
to the case of (linear) regression and of variable se-
lection is briefly considered, noticing that (a) for a
single regressor (Section 5.91), the problem is ex-
actly equivalent to testing whether or not a normal
mean µ is equal to 0 and (b) for more than one re-
gressor (Section 5.92), the test of nullity of one coef-
ficient can be done conditionally on the others, that
is, they can be treated as nuisance parameters under
both hypotheses. (The case of linear calibration in
Section 5.93 is also processed as a by-product.)
6.5 A Foray into Hierarchical Bayes
Section 5.4 explores further tests related to the
normal distribution, but Section 5.41 starts with a
highly unusual perspective. When testing whether
or not the means of two normal samples—with like-
lihood L(µ1, µ2, σ) proportional to
σ−n1−n2 exp
{
− n1
2σ2
(x¯1 − µ1)2
− n2
2σ2
(x¯2 − µ2)2 − n1s
2
1+ n2s
2
2
2σ2
}
,
—are equal, that is, H0 :µ1 = µ2, Jeffreys also intro-
duces the value of the common mean, µ, into the
alternative. A possible, albeit slightly apocryphal,
interpretation is to consider µ as an hyperparame-
ter that appears both under the null and under the
alternative, which is then an incentive to use a single
improper prior under both hypotheses (once again
because of the lack of relevance of the correspond-
ing pseudo-normalizing constant). But there is still
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a difficulty with the introduction of three different
alternatives with a hyperparameter µ:
µ1 = µ and µ2 6= µ, µ1 6= µ and µ2 = µ,
µ1 6= µ and µ2 6= µ.
Given that µ has no intrinsic meaning under the al-
ternative, the most logical46 translation of this mul-
tiplication of alternatives is that the three formula-
tions lead to three different priors,
pi11(µ,µ1, µ2, σ)∝ 1
pi
1
σ2 + (µ2 − µ)2 Iµ1=µ,
pi12(µ,µ1, µ2, σ)∝ 1
pi
1
σ2 + (µ1 − µ)2 Iµ2=µ,
pi13(µ,µ1, µ2, σ)
∝ 1
pi2
σ
{σ2 + (µ1 − µ)2}{σ2 + (µ2 − µ)2} .
When pi11 and pi12 are written in terms of a Dirac
mass, they are clearly identical,
pi11(µ1, µ2, σ) = pi12(µ1, µ2, σ)
∝ 1
pi
1
σ2 + (µ1 − µ2)2 .
If we integrate out µ in pi13, the resulting posterior
is
pi13(µ1, µ2, σ)∝ 2
pi
1
4σ2 + (µ1 − µ2)2 ,
whose only difference from pi11 is that the scale in
the Cauchy is twice as large. As noticed later by
Jeffreys, there is little to choose between the alterna-
tives, even though the third modeling makes more
sense from a modern, hierarchical point of view: µ
and σ denote the location and scale of the prob-
lem, no matter which hypothesis holds, with an ad-
ditional parameter (µ1, µ2) in the case of the alter-
native hypothesis. Using a common improper prior
under both hypotheses can then be justified via a
limiting argument, as in Marin and Robert (2007),
because those parameters are common to both mod-
els. Seen as such, the Bayes factor∫
σ−n−1 exp
{
− n1
2σ2
(x¯1 − µ)2
46This does not seem to be Jeffreys’s perspective, since he
later (in Sections 5.46 and 5.47) adds up the posterior prob-
abilities of those three alternatives, effectively dividing the
Bayes factor by 3 or such.
− n2
2σ2
(x¯2 − µ)2 − n1s
2
1 + n2s
2
2
2σ2
}
dσ dµ
/∫ σ−n+1
pi2
exp
{
− n1
2σ2
(x¯1 − µ1)2
− n2
2σ2
(x¯2 − µ2)2 − n1s
2
1+ n2s
2
2
2σ2
}
/({σ2 + (µ1 − µ)2}
· {σ2 + (µ2 − µ)2})dσ dµdµ1 dµ2
makes more sense because of the presence of σ and µ
on both the numerator and the denominator. While
the numerator can be fully integrated into√
pi/2nΓ{(n− 1)/2}(ns20/2)−(n−1)/2,
where ns20 denotes the usual sum of squares, the
denominator∫
σ−n
pi/2
exp
{
− n1
2σ2
(x¯1 − µ1)2
− n2
2σ2
(x¯2 − µ2)2 − n1s
2
1 + n2s
2
2
2σ2
}
/(4σ2 + (µ1 − µ2)2)dσ dµ1 dµ2
does require numerical or Monte Carlo integration.
It can actually be written as an expectation under
the standard noninformative posteriors,
σ2 ∼ IG((n− 3)/2, (n1s21 + n2s22)/2),
µ1 ∼N (x¯1, σ2/n1), µ2 ∼N (x¯2, σ2/n2),
of the quantity
h(µ1, µ2, σ
2)
=
2√
n1n2
Γ((n− 3)/2){(n1s21 + n2s22)/2}−(n−3)/2
4σ2 + (µ1 − µ2)2 .
When simulating a range of values of the sufficient
statistics (ni, x¯i, si)i=1,2, the difference between the
Bayes factor and Jeffreys’s approximation,
K ≈ 2
(
pi
2
n1n2
n1 + n2
)1/2
·
{
1 + n1n2n1 + n2
(x¯1 − x¯2)2
n1s
2
1 + n2s
2
}−(n1+n2−1)/2
,
is spectacular, as shown in Figure 9. The larger dis-
crepancy (when compared to earlier figures) can be
attributed in part to the larger number of sufficient
statistics involved in this setting.
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Fig. 9. Comparison of a Monte Carlo approximation to the
Bayes factor for the normal mean comparison problem and
of Jeffreys’s approximation, corresponding to 103 statistics
(ni, x¯i, si)i=1,2 and 10
4 generations from the noninformative
posterior.
A similar split of the alternative is studied in Sec-
tion 5.42 when the standard deviations are differ-
ent under both models, with further simplifications
in Jeffreys’s approximations to the posteriors (since
the µi’s are integrated out). It almost seems as if
x¯1 − x¯2 acts as a pseudo-sufficient statistic. If we
start from a generic representation with L(µ1, µ2,
σ1, σ2) proportional to
σ−n11 σ
−n2
2 exp
{
− n1
2σ21
(x¯1 − µ1)2
− n2
2σ22
(x¯2 − µ2)2 − n1s
2
1
2σ21
− n2s
2
2
2σ22
}
,
and if we use again pi(µ,σ1, σ2)∝ 1/σ1σ2 under the
null hypothesis and
pi11(µ1, µ2, σ1, σ2)∝ 1
σ1σ2
1
pi
σ1
σ21 + (µ2 − µ1)2
,
pi12(µ1, µ2, σ1, σ2)∝ 1
σ1σ2
1
pi
σ2
σ22 + (µ2 − µ1)2
,
pi13(µ,µ1, µ2, σ1, σ2)
∝ 1
σ1σ2
1
pi2
σ1σ2
{σ21 + (µ1 − µ)2}{σ22 + (µ2 − µ)2}
under the alternative, then, as stated in Theory of
Probability,∫
σ−n1−11 σ
−n2−1
2 exp
{
− n1
2σ21
(x¯1 − µ)2
− n2
2σ22
(x¯2 − µ)2
− n1s
2
1
2σ21
− n2s
2
2
2σ22
}
dµ
=
√
2pi/(n2σ21 + n1σ
2
2)σ
−n1
1 σ
−n2
2
· exp
{
− (x¯1 − x¯2)
2
2(σ21/n1 + σ
2
2/n2)
− n1s
2
1
2σ21
− n2s
2
2
2σ22
}
,
but the computation of∫
exp
{
− n1
2σ21
(x¯1 − µ1)2 − n2
2σ22
(x¯2 − µ)2
}
· 2
2piσ2
dµdµ1
σ21 + (µ− µ1)2
[and the alternative versions] is not possible in closed
form. We note that pi13 corresponds to a distribution
on the difference µ1 − µ2 with density equal to
pi13(µ1, µ2|σ1, σ2)
=
1
pi
((σ1 + σ2)(µ1 − µ2)2
+ σ31 − σ21σ2 − σ1σ22 + σ32)
/([(µ1 − µ2)2 + σ21 + σ22 ]2 − 4σ21σ22)
=
1
pi
(σ1 + σ2)(y
2 + σ21 − 2σ1σ2 + σ22)
(y2 + (σ1 + σ2)2)(y2 + (σ1 − σ2)2)
=
1
pi
σ1 + σ2
y2 + (σ1 + σ2)2
,
thus equal to a Cauchy distribution with scale (σ1+
σ2).
47 Jeffreys uses instead a Laplace approxima-
tion,
2σ1
n1n2
1
σ21 + (x¯1 − x¯2)2
,
to the above integral, with no further justification.
Given the differences between the three formulations
of the alternative hypothesis, it makes sense to try
to compare further those three priors (in our re-
interpretation as hierarchical priors). As noted by
Jeffreys, there may be considerable grounds for de-
cision between the alternative hypotheses. It seems
to us (based on the Laplace approximations) that
the most sensible prior is the hierarchical one, pi13,
47While this result follows from the derivation of the den-
sity by integration, a direct proof follows from considering
the characteristic function of the Cauchy distribution C(0, σ),
equal to exp−σ|ξ| (see Feller, 1971).
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in that the scale depends on both variances rather
than only one.
An extension of the test on a (normal) standard
deviation is considered in Section 5.44 for the agree-
ment of two estimated standard errors. Once again,
the most straightforward interpretation of Jeffreys’s
derivation is to see it as a hierarchical modeling,
with a reference prior pi(σ) = 1/σ on a global scale,
σ1 say, and the corresponding (testing) Jeffreys prior
on the ratio σ1/σ2 = exp ζ . The Bayes factor (in fa-
vor of the null hypothesis) is then given by
K =
√
2
pi/∫ ∞
−∞
cosh(ζ)
cosh(2ζ)
e−n1ζ
(
n1e
2(z−ζ) + n2
n2e2z + n2
)−n/2
dζ,
if z denotes log s1/s2 = log σˆ1/σˆ2.
6.6 P -what?!
Section 5.6 embarks upon a historically interest-
ing discussion on the warnings given by too good a
p-value: if, for instance, a χ2 test leads to a value of
the χ2 statistic that is very small, this means (al-
most certain) incompatibility with the χ2 assump-
tion just as well as too large a value. (Jeffreys re-
calls the example of the data set of Mendel that was
modified by hand to agree with the Mendelian law
of inheritance, leading to too small a χ2 value.) This
can be seen as an indirect criticism of the standard
tests (see also Section 8 below).
7. CHAPTER VI: SIGNIFICANCE TESTS:
VARIOUS COMPLICATIONS
The best way of testing differences from a
systematic rule is always to arrange our work so as
to ask and answer one question at a time.
H. Jeffreys, Theory of Probability, Section 6.1.
This chapter appears as a marginalia of the pre-
vious one in that it contains no major advance but
rather a sequence of remarks, such as, for instance,
an entry on time-series models (see Section 7.2 be-
low). The very first paragraph of this chapter pro-
duces a remarkably simple and intuitive justification
of the incompatibility between improper priors and
significance tests: the mere fact that we are seriously
considering the possibility that it is zero may be as-
sociated with a presumption that if it is not zero it
is probably small.
Then, Section 6.0 discusses the difficulty of set-
tling for an informative prior distribution that takes
into account the actual state of knowledge. By subdi-
viding the sample into groups, different conclusions
can obviously be reached, but this contradicts the
Likelihood Principle that the whole data set must
be used simultaneously. Of course, this could also
be interpreted as a precursor attempt at defining
pseudo-Bayes factors (Berger and Pericchi, 1996).
Otherwise, as correctly pointed out by Jeffreys, the
prior probability when each subsample is considered
is not the original prior probability but the poste-
rior probability left by the previous one, which is
the basic implementation of the Bayesian learning
principle. However, even with this correction, the
final outcome of a sequential approach is not the
proper Bayesian solution, unless posteriors are also
used within the integrals of the Bayes factor.
Section 6.5 also recapitulates both Chapters V
and VI with general comments. It reiterates the warn-
ing, already made earlier, that the Bayes factors ob-
tained via this noninformative approach are usually
rarely immensely in favor of H0. This somehow con-
tradicts later studies, like those of Berger and Sellke
(1987) and Berger, Boukai and Wang (1997), that
the Bayes factor is generally less prone to reject the
null hypothesis. Jeffreys argues that, when an alter-
native is actually used (. . .), the probability that it is
false is always of order n−1/2, without further justi-
fication. Note that this last section also includes the
seeds of model averaging: when a set of alternative
hypotheses (models Mr) is considered, the predic-
tive should be
p(x′|x) =
∑
r
pr(x
′|x)pi(Mr|x),
rather than conditional on the accepted hypothesis.
Obviously, when K is large, [this] will give almost
the same inference as the selected model/hypothesis.
7.1 Multiple Parameters
Although it should proceed from first principles,
the extension of Jeffreys’s (second) rule for selection
priors (see Section 6.4) to several parameters is dis-
cussed in Sections 6.1 and 6.2 in a spirit similar to
the reference priors of Berger and Bernardo (1992),
by pointing out that, if two parameters α and β are
introduced sequentially against the null hypothesis
H0 :α = β = 0, testing first that α 6= 0 then β 6= 0
conditional on α does not lead to the same joint
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prior as the symmetric steps of testing first β 6= 0
then α 6= 0 conditional on β. In fact,
darctanJ1/2α darctanJ
1/2
β|α
6= darctanJ1/2β darctanJ1/2α|β .
Jeffreys then suggests using instead the marginal-
ized version
pi(α,β) =
1
pi2
dJ
1/2
α
dα
1 + Jα
dJ
1/2
β
dβ
1 + Jβ
,
although he acknowledges that there are cases where
the symmetry does not make sense (as, for instance,
when parameters are not defined under the null, as,
e.g., in a mixture setting). He then resorts to Ock-
ham’s razor (Section 6.12) to rank those unidimen-
sional tests by stating that there is a best order of
procedures, although there are cases where such an
ordering is arbitrary or not even possible. Section 6.2
considers a two-dimensional parameter (λ,µ) and,
switching to polar coordinates, uses a (half-)Cauchy
prior on the radius ρ =
√
λ2 + µ2 (and a uniform
prior on the angle). The Bayes factor for testing the
nullity of the parameter (λ,µ) is then
K =
∫
σ−2n−1 exp
{
−2ns
2+ n(x¯2 + y¯2)
2σ2
}
dσ
/∫ 1
pi2σ2n
· exp{−(2ns2
+ n([x¯− λ]2
+ [y¯ − µ]2))/2σ2} dλdµdσ
ρ(σ2 + ρ2)
= 2n(n− 1)!{2ns2 + n(x¯2 + y¯2)}−n/∫ 1
pi2σ2n
· exp
{
− n
2σ2
· [2s2 + ρˆ2
− 2ρρˆ cosφ+ ρ2]
}
dφdρdσ
ρ(σ2 + ρ2)
,
where ρˆ2 = x¯2+ y¯2 and which can only be integrated
up to
1
K
=
2
pi
∫ ∞
0
exp
(
− ns
2v2
2s2 + ρˆ2
)
· 1F1
{
1− n,1,− nρˆ
2v2
2(2s2 + ρˆ2)
}
dv
1 + v2
,
1F1 denoting a confluent hypergeometric function.
A similar analysis is conducted in Section 6.21 for
a linear regression model associated with a pair of
harmonics (xt = α cos t+ β sin t+ εt), the only dif-
ference being the inclusion of the covariate scales A
and B within the prior,
pi(α,β|σ)
=
√
A2 +B2
pi2
√
2
· σ√
α2 + β2{σ2 + (A2 +B2)(α2 + β2)/2} .
7.2 Markovian Models
While the title of Section 6.3 (Partial and serial
correlation) is slightly misleading, this section deals
with an AR(1) model,
xt+1 = ρxt + τεt.
It is not conclusive with respect to the selection of
the prior on ρ given that Jeffreys does not consider
the null value ρ= 0 but rather ρ= ±1 which leads
to difficulties, if only because there is no stationary
distribution in that case. Since the Kullback diver-
gence is given by
J(ρ, ρ′) =
1+ ρρ′
(1− ρ2)(1− ρ′2) (ρ
′ − ρ)2,
Jeffreys’s (testing) prior (against H0 :ρ= 0) should
be
1
pi
J1/2(ρ,0)′
1 + J(ρ,0)
=
1
pi
1√
1− ρ2 ,
which is also Jeffreys’s regular (estimation) prior in
that case.
The (other) correlation problem of Section 6.4 also
deals with a Markov structure, namely, that
P (xt+1 = s|xt = r) =
{
α+ (1−α)pr, if s= r,
(1− α)ps, otherwise,
the null (independence) hypothesis corresponding
to H0 :α = 0. Note that this parameterization of
the Markov model means that the pr’s are the sta-
tionary probabilities. The Kullback divergence being
particularly intractable,
J = α
m∑
r=1
pr log
{
1 +
α
pr(1− α)
}
,
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Fig. 10. Jeffreys’s prior of the coefficient α for the Markov
model of Section 6.4.
Jeffreys first produces the approximation
J ≈ (m− 1)α
2
1−α
that would lead to the (testing) prior
2
pi
1− α/2√
1− α(1−α+α2)
[since the primitive of the above is −arctan(√1−α/
α)], but the possibility of negative48 α leads him to
use instead a flat prior on the possible range of α’s.
Note from Figure 10 that the above prior is quite
peaked in α= 1.
8. CHAPTER VII: FREQUENCY DEFINITIONS
AND DIRECT METHODS
An hypothesis that may be true may be rejected
because it has not predicted observable
results that have not occurred.
H. Jeffreys, Theory of Probability, Section 7.2.
This short chapter opposes the classical approaches
of the time (Fisher’s fiducial and likelihood method-
ologies, Pearson’s and Neyman’s p-values) to the
Bayesian principles developed in the earlier chap-
ters. (The very first part of the chapter is a digres-
sion on the “frequentist” theories of probability that
is not particularly relevant from a mathematical per-
spective and that we have already addressed earlier.
48Because of the very specific (unidimensional) parameter-
ization of the Markov chain, using a negative α indeed makes
sense.
See, however, Dawid, 2004, for a general synthesis
on this point.) The fact that Student’s and Fisher’s
analyses of the t statistic coincide with Jeffreys’s is
seen as an argument in favor both of the Bayesian
approach and of the choice of the reference prior
pi(µ,σ)∝ 1/σ.
The most famous part of the chapter (Section 7.2)
contains the often-quoted sentence above, which ap-
plies to the criticism of p-values, since a decision to
reject the null hypothesis is based on the observed
p-value being in the upper tail of its distribution un-
der the null, even though nothing but the observed
value is relevant. Given that the p-value is a one-
to-one transform of the original test statistics, the
criticism is maybe less virulent than it appears: Jef-
freys still refers to twice the standard error as a cri-
terion for possible genuineness and three times the
standard error for definite acceptance. The major
criticism that this quantity does not account for the
alternative hypothesis (as argued, for instance, in
Berger and Wolpert, 1988) does not appear at this
stage, but only later in Section 7.22. As perceived
in Theory of Probability, the problem with Pear-
son’s and Fisher’s approaches is therefore rather the
use of a convenient bound on the test statistic as
two standard deviations (or on the p-value as 0.05).
There is, however, an interesting remark that the
choice of the hypothesis should eventually be aimed
at selecting the best inference, even though Jeffreys
concludes that there is no way of stating this suffi-
ciently precisely to be of any use. Again, expressing
this objective in decision-theoretic terms seems the
most natural solution today. Interestingly, the fol-
lowing sentence in Section 7.51 could be interpreted,
once again in an apocryphal way, as a precursor to
decision theory: There are cases where there is no
positive new parameter, but important consequences
might follow if it was not zero, leading to loss func-
tions mixing estimation and testing as in Robert and
Casella (1994).
In Section 7.5 we find a similarly interesting rein-
terpretation of the classical first and second type
errors, computing an integrated error based on the
0–1 loss (even though it is not defined this way) as∫ ac
0
f1(x)dx+
∫ ∞
ac
f0(x)dx,
where x is the test statistic, f0 and f1 are the mar-
ginals under the null and under the alternative, re-
spectively, and ac is the bound for acceptingH0. The
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optimal value of ac is therefore given by f0(ac) =
f1(ac), which amounts to
pi(H0|x= ac) = pi(Hc0|x= ac),
that is,K = 1 if both hypotheses are equally weighted
a priori. This is a completely rigorous derivation
of the optimal Bayesian decision for testing, even
though Jeffreys does not approach it this way, in
particular, because the prior probabilities are not
necessarily equal (a point discussed earlier in Sec-
tion 6.0 for instance). It is nonetheless a fairly con-
vincing argument against p-values in terms of small-
est number of mistakes. More prosaically, Jeffreys
briefly discusses in this section the disturbing asym-
metry of frequentist tests, when both hypotheses are
of the same type: if we must choose between two def-
initely stated alternatives, we should naturally take
the one that gives the larger likelihood, even though
each may be within the range of acceptance of the
other.
9. CHAPTER VIII: GENERAL QUESTIONS
A prior probability used to express ignorance is
merely the formal statement of that ignorance.
H. Jeffreys, Theory of Probability, Section 8.1.
This concluding chapter summarizes the main rea-
sons for using the Bayesian perspective:
1. Prior and sampling probabilities are represen-
tations of degrees of belief rather than frequencies
(Section 8.0). Once again, we believe that this de-
bate49 is settled today, by considering that proba-
bility distributions and improper priors are defined
according to the rules of measure theory; see, how-
ever, Dawid (2004) for another perspective oriented
toward calibration.
2. While prior probabilities are subjective and can-
not be uniquely assessed, Theory of Probability sets
a general (objective) principle for the derivation of
prior distributions (Section 8.1). It is quite inter-
esting to read Jeffreys’s defence of this point when
taking into account the fact that this book was set-
ting the point of reference for constructing nonin-
formative priors. Theory of Probability does little,
however, toward the construction of informative pri-
ors by integrating existing prior information (except
49Jeffreys argues that the limit definition was not stated till
eighty years later than Bayes, which sounds incorrect when
considering that the Law of Large Numbers was produced by
Bernoulli in Ars Conjectandi.
in the sequential case discussed earlier), recogniz-
ing nonetheless the natural discrepancy between two
probability distributions conditional on two differ-
ent data sets. More fundamentally, this stresses that
Theory of Probability focuses on prior probabilities
used to express ignorance more than anything else.
3. Bayesian statistics naturally allow for model
specification and, as such, do not suffer (as much)
from the neglect of an unforeseen alternative (Sec-
tion 8.2). This is obviously true only to some extent:
if, in the process of comparing models Mi based on
an experiment, one very likely model is omitted from
the list, the consequences may be severe. On the
other hand, and in relation to the previous discus-
sion on the p-values, the Bayesian approach allows
for alternative models and is thus naturally embed-
ding model specification within its paradigm.50 The
fact that it requires an alternative hypothesis to op-
erate a test is an illustration of this feature.
4. Different theories leading to the same poste-
riors cannot be distinguished since questions that
cannot be decided by means of observations are best
left alone (Section 8.3). The physicists’51 concept
of rejection of unobservables is to be understood as
the elimination of parameters in a law that make no
contribution to the results of any observation or as a
version of Ockham’s principle, introducing new pa-
rameters only when observations showed them to be
necessary (Section 8.4). See Dawid (1984, 2004) for
a discussion of this principle he calls Jeffreys’s Law.
5. The theory of Bayesian statistics as presented
in Theory of Probability is consistent in that it pro-
vides general rules to construct noninformative pri-
ors and to conduct tests of hypotheses (Section 8.6).
It is in agreement with the Likelihood Principle and
with conditioning on sufficient statistics.52 It also
avoids the use of p-values for testing hypotheses by
requiring no empirical hypothesis to be true or false
50The point about being prepared for occasional wrong de-
cisions could possibly be related to Popper’s notion of fal-
sifiability : by picking a specific prior, it is always possible to
modify inference toward one’s goal. Of course, the divergences
between Jeffreys’s and Popper’s approaches to induction make
them quite irreconcilable. See Dawid (2004) for a Bayes–de
Finetti–Popper synthesis.
51Both paragraphs Sections 8.3 and 8.4 seem only con-
cerned with a physicists’ debate, particularly about the rele-
vance of quantum theory.
52We recall that Fisher information is not fully compatible
with the Likelihood Principle (Berger and Wolpert, 1988).
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a priori. However, special cases and multidimen-
sional settings show that this theory cannot claim
to be completely universal.
6. The final paragraph of Theory of Probability
states that the present theory does not justify induc-
tion; what it does is to provide rules for consistency.
This is absolutely coherent with the above: although
the book considers many special cases and excep-
tions, it does provide a general rule for conduct-
ing point inference (estimation) and testing of hy-
potheses by deriving generic rules for the construc-
tion of noninformative priors. Many other solutions
are available, but the consistency cannot be denied,
while a ranking of those solutions is unthinkable.
In essence, Theory of Probability has thus mostly
achieved its goal of presenting a self-contained the-
ory of inference based on a minimum of assumptions
and covering the whole field of inferential purposes.
10. CONCLUSION
It is essential to the possibility of induction that we
shall be prepared for occasional wrong decisions.
H. Jeffreys, Theory of Probability, Section 8.2.
Despite a tone that some may consider as overly
critical, and therefore unfair to such a pioneer in our
field, this perusal of Theory of Probability leaves us
with the feeling of a considerable achievement to-
ward the formalization of Bayesian theory and the
construction of an objective and consistent frame-
work. Besides setting the Bayesian principle in full
generality,
Posterior Probability ∝PriorProbability ·Likelihood ,
including using improper priors indistinctly from prop-
er priors, the book sets a generic theory for selecting
reference priors in general inferential settings,
pi(θ)∝ |I(θ)|1/2,
as well as when testing point null hypotheses,
1
pi
dJ1/2
1 + J
=
1
pi
d{tan−1 J1/2(θ)},
when J(θ) = div{f(·|θ0), f(·|θ)} is a divergence mea-
sure between the sampling distribution under the
null and under the alternative. The lack of a decision-
theoretic formalism for point estimation notwith-
standing, Jeffreys sets up a completely operational
technology for hypothesis testing and model choice
that is centered on the Bayes factor. Premises of hi-
erarchical Bayesian analysis, reference priors, match-
ing priors and mixture analysis can be found at var-
ious places in the book. That it sometimes lacks
mathematical rigor and often indulges in debates
that may look superficial today is once again a re-
flection of the idiosyncrasies of the time: even the
ultimate revolutions cannot be built on void and
they do need the shoulders of earlier giants to step
further. We thus absolutely acknowledge the depth
and worth of Theory of Probability as a foundational
text for Bayesian Statistics and hope that the cur-
rent review may help in its reassessment.
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